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Unsexing the Fourth Amendment
I. Bennett Capers*
Although rarely remarked upon in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
traditional notions of sex and gender matter in a host of areas, from stop
and frisks on the streets, to strip searches in schools and prisons, to the pat
downs and body scans that have become the new normal at airports. The
first goal of this Article is to uncover and draw attention to this aspect of
the Fourth Amendment. The second concededly more ambitious goal is to
interrogate this reliance on tradition. A Fourth Amendment preference for
same-gender searches may comport with notions of modesty and societal
norms. But, at what cost to the Fourth Amendment? And, at what cost to
true equality?
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Unsexing the Fourth Amendment
[TI he officer must feel with sensitive fingers every portion of the
prisoner's body. A thorough search must be made of the prisoner's
arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area about
the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to the feet.
- Terry v. Ohio'
To treat men and women as equals does not require that courts
ignore that differences exist. Even prisoners, men or women, are
entitled to a modicum of privacy and are entitled not to be
embarrassed by needlessly requiring that they expose their
nakedness and private parts to guards who are of the opposite sex.
- Timm v. Gunter2
If you touch my junk, I'm gonna have you arrested.
- John Tyner 3
INTRODUCTION
It is hard to overstate the significance of Mapp v. Ohio, 4 which made
the exclusionary rule binding on the states5 and has rightfully been
called the "most important search-and-seizure decision in history.' 6 It
is also hard to overstate the significance of United States v. Mendenhall,7
1 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.13 (1968) (quoting L.L. Priar & T.F. Martin, Searching and
Disarming Criminals, 45J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 481, 481 (1954)).
2 917 F.2d 1093, 1103 (8th Cir. 1990) (Bright,J., dissenting).
3 Chris McGreal, 'Don't Touch My Junk' Passenger Sparks Revolt Against Airport
Searches, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 19, 2010, 11:00 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
2010/nov/19/dont-touch-junk-airport-searches (describing "revolt" resulting from John
Tyner's refusal to submit to a pat down search).
4 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5 Id. at 655. In other words, if the police obtain evidence in violation of a
defendant's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches or seizures,
the primary remedy is that the evidence will be excluded at trial.
6 Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development
and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365,
1368 (1983); see also Yale Kamisar, Mapp v. Ohio: The First Shot Fired in the Warren
Court's Criminal Procedure "Revolution," in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 45, 45 (Carol
S. Steiker ed., 2006) [hereinafter The First Shot] (noting that Mapp "is generally regarded
as having launched the so-called criminal procedure revolution").
7 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
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which introduced the Fourth Amendment's "free to leave" test.8 In
doing so, Mendenhall cast most police-citizen encounters as consensual
and thus outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment.9 But there is
an aspect of these cases, indeed, of a whole slew of cases, that to date
has gone entirely unremarked upon. These cases reveal our concern
with traditional notions of sex and gender. More specifically, both cases
reveal our concern with what I term "sexy searches," those searches that
courts and other decision-makers assume run the risk of sexual
impropriety.' 0 In Mapp, the officers reached into "Miss Mapp's"
bosom." In Mendenhall, the male DEA agents, rather than searching
Sylvia Mendenhall themselves, sought help outside of the DEA,
summoning a female "policewoman" to conduct the search.' 2
In fact, traditional notions of sex and gender inform much of Fourth
Amendment practice and jurisprudence. These notions matter with
respect to Terry stop and frisks - those limited detentions and pat
downs that officers engage in when they have articulable, reasonable
suspicion that someone may be engaged in criminal activity, and that
the person may be armed and dangerous. They matter with respect to
more thorough searches incident to arrest, and how we monitor
prisoners. Beyond the criminal arena, they dictate who conducts
searches of students in public schools, and even which TSA employee
searches which passenger.
All of this ties in to the first goal of this Article to show traditional
notions of sex and gender inform much of what is considered
"reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. The second goal is
normative: to ask what we should make of this reliance on traditional
notions of sex and gender? A Fourth Amendment preference for same-
8 Id. at 554.
9 See id. at 553-54. To put it simply, some police stops are beyond the purview of
the Fourth Amendment, and require neither reasonable suspicion nor probable cause
nor any other justification; if a reasonable, innocent person would feel free to leave, the
"stop" will be deemed a consensual encounter, akin to a "friendly exchange[] of
pleasantries," Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968), and thus not subject to the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
10 The term I use in this Article, "sexy searches," is in part a play on Duncan
Kennedy's well-known book, Sexy Dressing. See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY
DRESSING ETC. (1993). To be clear, from the perspective of those searched, these
searches are anything but sexy. That said, the term "sexy searches" does capture,
however problematic, the perspective of the person conducting an inappropriate sexual
search, or what in feminist art discourse might be termed the "male gaze." Perhaps more
importantly, it captures much of the concern at issue with respect to bodily searches in
Fourth Amendment reasonableness determinations.
11 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,644-45 (1961).
12 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 548-49.
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gender searches may comport with notions of modesty and societal
norms. But at what cost to the Fourth Amendment? And, at what cost
to true equality?
Look beneath the surface, and a preference for same-gender searches
- as reflected in Fourth Amendment decisions and government
policies - sends troubling expressive messages. This preference
suggests that sexual attraction, as a normative matter, lies in opposite-
gender touching, not same-gender touching. It communicates that we
must shield women's bodies in particular from prying eyes and hands.
The effect is a curious one, proscribing heterosexual touching while
eroticizing women's bodies and their purported unavailability.13 In
recent years, scholars such as Laura Rosenbury and Jennifer Rothman,
Melissa Murray, Katherine Franke, Deb Tuerkheimer, and Margo
Kaplan have observed that much of the law is sex-negative. 14 What an
examination of our Fourth Amendment preference for same-gender
searches adds is this gloss: it is complicated. Sex is both below the
surface, and also front and center. Sexy searches (again, those searches
that courts and other decision-makers assume run the risk of sexual
impropriety) are fiercely policed, yet, in a way that reveals a
preoccupation with the spectacle of sex and that tantalizes with its very
forbidden-ness. Our purported concern for modesty, examined more
closely, reveals itself as a mechanism for both regulating and eroticizing
heterosexual attraction, while closeting other attractions. 15 Our concern
for privacy, upon closer inspection, reveals itself to be a polite way of
perpetuating the objectification and subordination of female bodies,
with hierarchy and protection and paternalism embedded in its
predicate - that one sex needs greater protection. Our claim of gender
parity - the claim that same-gender searches treat the sexes equally -
upon closer inspection reveals itself to be a rhetorical strategy as
13 In this sense, our official aversion to cross-gender searches is part of the
"pornographic state," to borrow from Ronald Collins and David Skover. See Ronald K.L.
Collins & David M. Skover, The Pornographic State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1374, 1374-75
(1994) (discussing the role sexuality and pornography play in American culture).
14 Margo Kaplan, Sex-Positive Law, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 89, 91-92 (2014); Laura A.
Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex in and out of Intimacy, 59 EMORY L.J. 809, 811
(2010); see Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 182-83 (2001); Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2012); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Judging Sex, 97 CORNELL L. REV.
1461, 1467 (2012). My own work is also critical of sex-negativity in the law. See I.
Bennett Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, 60 UCLA L. REV. 826, 858-59 (2013)
[hereinafter Real Women, Real Rape].
15 Cf. Amy Adler, Girls! Girls! Girls!: The Supreme Court Confronts the G-String, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1108 (2005) (discussing the Supreme Court's nude dancing cases).
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bankrupt as the defense offered to justify separate but equal segregation
in the context of race.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I first provides a fuller discussion
of Mapp and Mendenhall, two cases where the reliance on traditional
notions of sex and gender, and fear of sexy searches, is implicit. Part I
then provides an overview of the many areas of Fourth Amendment law
and practice where we explicitly worry about sexy searches. Against that
backdrop, Part II examines the use of sex and gender to inform Fourth
Amendment decisions about the reasonableness of various searches. My
argument here is three-fold: that a preference for same-gender searches
relies on stereotypes about men as predators and women as vulnerable
victims and erases sexual difference; that this preference undermines our
anti-discrimination principles; and that this preference reifies and,
indeed, over-determines gender difference, and in doing so functions as
a type of state-imposed sexual discipline. Part III turns to the related
issue of segregated restrooms, or what critical theorist Jacques Lacan
aptly called "urinary segregation."' 16 Part IV then turns to an issue that I
suspect informs much thinking about cross-gender searches: race.
Finally, Part V argues that it is time to unsex the Fourth Amendment,
and sketches out an alternative.
I. SEX AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The first goal of this Article is to uncover the role traditional notions
of sex and gender play in our Fourth Amendment decisions and
practices. I begin with the harder examples, two cases where this role
goes unstated, functioning as a type of "white-letter law,"'17 as it does in
Mapp and Mendenhall. I then turn to areas where the proof is
indisputable, and the role is visible in black and white: administrative
regulations and judicial opinions.
16 Jacques Lacan, The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious, in ECRITS: A SELECTION
146, 151 (Alan Sheridan trans., Norton 1977).
17 1 first introduced the concept "white-letter law" in an earlier article. See 1. Bennett
Capers, The Trial of Bigger Thomas: Race, Gender, and Trespass, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 1, 7-8 (2006) [hereinafter The Trial of Bigger Thomas]. Unlike black-letter law
- which suggests "statutory law, the written law, the easily discernible law set forth as
black letters on a white page" - "white-letter law" suggests "societal and normative
laws that stand side by side with, and often undergird, black-letter law but, as if
inscribed in white ink on white paper, remain invisible to the naked eye." Id.; see also 1.
Bennett Capers, The Unintentional Rapist, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1345, 1357 (2010)
[hereinafter The Unintentional Rapist].
[Vol. 48:855
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A. Mapp and Mendenhall
Mapp v. Ohio has rightfully been described as the "most important
search-and-seizure decision in history."18 However, far beneath the
surface is an aspect that has been largely ignored: the role of sex and
gender. By this, I am referring not only to the fact that Dollree Mapp
was female and that the officers were all male. I am also referring to the
events that preceded the search of Mapp's house. When Dollree Mapp
confronted the officers and insisted, "I want to see the search
warrant,"19 the officers responded by flashing what they claimed to be a
warrant,20 which Mapp promptly snatched and placed "in her bosom."21
The officers responded by promptly reaching into her bosom and
snatching it back. They then arrested her for being "belligerent,"' 22 and
proceeded to conduct a warrantless search of her house. While it is
impossible to know what role these facts played, it seems safe to say that
the image of police officers reaching into Dollree Mapp's bosom was not
lost upon the Court. Indeed, it seems likely that this image informed
the Court's determination that it was time, indeed past time, to "close
the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official
lawlessness" 23 and hold that "all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority,
inadmissible in a state court."24
Occurring nearly twenty years later, United States v. Mendenhall
involved concern about propriety and the risk of a sexy search as well,
though this aspect of the search is similarly in the background. Here,
too, the facts matter. Sylvia Mendenhall - again, a young, black
woman 25 - landed at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport after flying from
18 Stewart, supra note 6, at 1368; see also Kamisar, The First Shot, supra note 6, at 46.
19 CAROLYN N. LONG, MAPP V. OHIO: GUARDING AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES 8 (2006).
20 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 644 (1961). No warrant was produced at trial, nor
did the prosecutor attempt to explain the absence of a warrant. LONG, supra note 19, at
17-22. In fact, both the sergeant and the prosecutor initially insisted to the trial court
that there was a search warrant. Id. at 17, 19. More than twenty years later, the sergeant
admitted that in fact the police did not have a warrant. Id. at 13.
21 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 644.
22 Id. The case also involved race, though the Court elided this fact. See I. Bennett
Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the Equality Principle,
46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 7 [hereinafter Rethinking the Fourth Amendment] (noting
"That Doliree Mapp was a black woman and the police were white men spoke volumes"
to the Court about the presumed basis for the officers' treatment of her).
23 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 654-55.
24 Id. at 655.
25 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558 (1980) (identifying Mendenhall
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Los Angeles, and immediately caught the attention of two DEA agents. 26
According to the agents, her conduct - apparently in disembarking the
airplane last and walking through the terminal - appeared "to be
characteristic of persons unlawfully carrying narcotics." 27 The agents
approached her, asked to see her identification and airline ticket, and
asked her why the name on her driver's license did not match the name
on her airline ticket. 28 One agent later testified that when they identified
themselves as agents with the Drug Enforcement Administration,
Mendenhall "'became quite shaken, extremely nervous. She had a hard
time speaking."' 29 The agent returned Mendenhall's ticket and driver's
license and asked her to come with them to an office at the airport for
further questioning.30 Once in the office, the agent asked Mendenhall if
she would allow a search of her person.31 According to the agent,
Mendenhall said, "'Go ahead"' and shortly after a female police officer
arrived to search her.32 Mendenhall undressed, eventually removing two
small packages from her undergarments. 33 One of the packages
appeared to contain heroin.34 Mendenhall handed the packages to the
officer, and the agents arrested her for possessing heroin.35
The Supreme Court case resulting from this arrest was based on
Mendenhall's argument that the agents had seized her without first
having articulable reasonable suspicion, as required by Terry v. Ohio.36
Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, rejected her argument.37 In doing
so, he also introduced what would come to be known as the "free to
leave" test: "a person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the
incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free
to leave." 38 PerJustice Stewart, because a reasonable person would have
as "a female and a Negro").
26 Id. at 547.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 547-48.
29 Id. at 548 (citation omitted in original).
30 Id.
31 Id. (citation omitted in original).
32 Id.
33 Id. at 549.
34 id.
35 Id.
36 See id.; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).
37 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 545.
38 Id. at 554. For more on the impact of the "free to leave" test, see Devon W.
Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 970 (2002), and
Daniel J. Steinbock, The Wrong Line Between Freedom and Restraint: The Unreality,
[Vol. 48:855
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apparently felt "free to end the conversation in the concourse and
proceed on her way," 39 there was not a seizure. As such, Mendenhall's
consent "to the subsequent search was [not] infected by an unlawful
detention."40
The Supreme Court extended and broadened the much criticized4
"free to leave" test in Florida v. Bostick,42 United States v. Drayton,43 and
INS v. Delgado.44 Much has been made of the likely role Mendenhall's
status rather than conduct played in why she was selected for a
"consensual encounter" and why she may have not in fact felt free to
leave.45 However, the role played by the other woman in the case, and the
care the Court took to emphasize her gender, has largely escaped notice:
A female officer then arrived to conduct the search of the
respondent's person. She asked the agents if the respondent had
consented to be searched. The agents said that she had, and the
respondent followed the policewoman into a private room.
There the policewoman again asked the respondent if she
consented to the search, and the respondent replied that she
did. The policewoman explained that the search would require
that the respondent remove her clothing. The respondent stated
that she had a plane to catch and was assured by the
policewoman that if she were carrying no narcotics, there would
Obscurity, and Incivility of the Fourth Amendment Consensual Encounter Doctrine, 38 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 507, 515-16 (2001).
39 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554-55.
40 Id. at 558.
41 See, e.g., Steinbock, supra note 38, at 515-16 (criticizing the Court's notion of a
reasonable person in the context of consensual encounters).
42 501 U.S. 429, 435-36 (1991).
43 536 U.S. 194, 207 (2002).
44 466 U.S. 210, 215-16 (1984).
45 See, e.g., Sherri Sharma, Beyond "Driving While Black" and "Flying While Brown":
Using Intersectionality to Uncover the Gendered Aspects of Racial Profiling, 12 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 275, 281-82 (2003) (discussing examples of black women being subject
to racial profiling). The particular suspicion black women have faced while flying is well
documented. A report released by the U.S. General Accounting Office found that black
women traveling internationally were nine times more likely than white women to be
subjected to X-rays or strip searches by U.S. Customs officials, even though they were
less than half as likely to be carrying contraband. Such targeting prompted a class action
suit against officials. John Gibeaut, Marked for Humiliation, A.B.A.J., Feb. 1999, at 46-
47; Black Women Searched More, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2000, at A17. The
suspicion attached to black women illustrates the benefits of an intersectionality
analysis to seeing and addressing biases. Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectional ity, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV.
1241, 1266-69 (1991).
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be no problem. The respondent then began to disrobe without
further comment. As the respondent removed her clothing, she
took from her undergarments two small packages, one of which
appeared to contain heroin, and handed both to the
policewoman. The agents then arrested the respondent for
possessing heroin.46
Three things stand out. First, the male agents found it necessary to
summon a female officer to conduct the search. Second, in order to
ensure a same-gender search, the federal DEA agents had to summon
the assistance of a female police officer. Third, none of this struck the
DEA agents, or the policewoman, or the Justices (at the time all male)
as anything other than proper. Again, though not the lynchpin of the
case, it seems more than conceivable that the fact that the search was
same-gender, and thus comported with traditional notions of modesty
and propriety, was part of what led the Court to conclude that
Mendenhall was free to leave and not coerced.47
That the Court may have been troubled by the cross-gender search of
Dollree Mapp's bosom, and reassured by the pains taken to conduct a
same-gender search of Sylvia Mendenhall, may seem natural. But these
likely responses from the Court also have their own provenance. After
all, police departments were considered male institutions. 48 As late as
1970, women still made up less than two percent of all officers,49 in
many places the number of women officers was limited by quotas, and
their job description - a carry-over from police "matrons" (think
Matron Mama Morton in the musical Chicago) - still consisted of
providing custodial care for women and children.50 Indeed, the rise of
46 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 548-49 (1980).
47 Even in Mendenhall itself, Justice Stewart seemed open to the view that gender
mattered, at least with respect to the seizure. He noted that even if Mendenhall, "a
female and a Negro, may have felt unusually threatened by the [first] officers, who were
white males," that these factors, "[wihile . .. not irrelevant . . . neither were they
decisive." Id. at 558. Indeed, Justice Stewart may have been primed to see Mendenhall's
interaction with law enforcement through a gendered lens. Just a few years earlier, he
had written the majority opinion in Dothard v. Rawlinson, which upheld the exclusion
of women from serving as guards in a male prison, finding that gender was a bona fide
occupational qualification under Title VII. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,323, 335-
37 (1977).
48 See David Alan Sklansky, Not Your Father's Police Department: Making Sense of the
New Demographics of Law Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209, 1220
(2006).
49 See SUSAN EHRLICH MARTIN & NANCY C. JURIK, DOING JUSTICE, DOING GENDER:
WOMEN IN LEGAL AND CRIMINALJUSTICE OCCUPATIONS 51 (2006).
50 See id. at 52.
864 [Vol. 48:855
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female officers beginning in the 1970s is traceable in part to the rise in
female criminality and to the fact that police departments assumed that
only women could search and monitor females taken into custody.51
Given this background, that law enforcement officers and courts would
consider a same-gender search of Mendenhall perfectly natural and an
indicium of the reasonableness of the search, while being troubled by
the cross-gender search of Mapp, is not surprising.
B. Other Sexy Searches
Again, Mapp and Mendenhall are both examples where traditional
notions of sex and gender operate in the background and communicate
a type of white-letter disapproval of cross-gender searches. What
follows, in perhaps the most prosaic portion of the Article, are areas
where the concern for propriety and fear of sexy searches, both in terms
of official regulations and judicial decisions, are front and center.
1. Terry Frisks
One reason to begin with Terry frisks is their sheer frequency,
especially in large cities. Consider New York City. According to its own
records, since 2004 the New York City Police Department has stopped
more than four million individuals, more than half of whom were
frisked. 52 What role does gender play in these stops? Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the vast majority of the individuals stopped are male,
about 92%; the remainder are "Female, Unknown, or Not Listed."53
However, the protocol police departments follow based on the gender
of the individual stopped is even more interesting.
When it comes to Terry frisks in large cities like New York and Los
Angeles, sex and gender matter, but practicalities matter more.54 Police
51 See PETER HORNE, WOMEN IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 82 (2d ed. 1980). The larger part
of this transformation is attributable to employment discrimination litigation and the
persistence of women to gain access to police department jobs.
52 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(finding New York City's stop and frisk practices violative of the Fourth Amendment).
53 Second Supplemental Report of Jeffrey Fagan at 11 tbl.3, Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d
540 (No. 08 Civ. 01034 (SAS)).
54 See, e.g., L.A. POLICE DEP'T, 2014 1ST QUARTER Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT
MANUAL § 217 (2014) (providing that when "an immediate cursory search for weapons is
necessary, it may be conducted by an officer of either sex"), available at http://
www.lapdonline.org/lapdmanual/volume_4.htm#217; N.Y. POLICE DEP'T, PATROL GUIDE
§ 208-5 (2013) (permitting cross-gender pat downs), available at https://muckrock.s3.
amazonaws.com/foiafiles/208-05_Arrests_-_GeneralSearchGuidelaines.pdf.
20151
University of California, Davis
departments remain overwhelmingly male,55 and quickly securing a
female officer to conduct a pat down is often not feasible. 56 It is partially
in deference to this concern about practicalities that courts have
rejected claims challenging routine cross-gender police frisks.57
By contrast, smaller police departments that conduct fewer Terry
frisks appear to be more attentive to ensuring that frisks are conducted
by an officer of the same gender.5 8 For example, Washington State
Attorney General's Office advises officers to "be reasonable ... and try
generally to use the same-gender officer [to conduct a pat-down] when
same-gender officer is present."59 Indeed, one reason why courts have
declined to place outer time limits on Terry stops is to allow police
departments time to secure a female officer for female suspects. 60
55 LYNN LANGTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, WOMEN IN LAW ENFORCEMENT,
1987-2008, at 2-3 (2010), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/wle8708.pdf
(noting that as of 2007, women accounted for approximately 15% of all officers in larger
police departments, but just 4-6% of all officers in small police departments).
56 Wendy Ruderman, For Women in Street Stops, Deeper Humiliation, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 6, 2012, at Al.
57 See, e.g., Stokes v. City of New York, No. 05-CV-0007, 2007 WL 1300983, at *12
n.9 (E.D.N.Y. May 3, 2007) (noting that other states have "repeatedly found" cross-
gender pat downs constitutional); Martin v. Swift, 781 F. Supp. 1250, 1254 (E.D. Mich.
1992) (observing that to prohibit cross-gender pat downs would require "every police
car to carry two officers, one male and one female, so that misdemeanants would be
searched by officers of the same sex"); cf. Ziegler v. Doe, No. 01-10377-BC, 2003 WL
21369254, at *3 (E.D. Mich. June 11, 2003) ("[Pllaintiff alleges a generalized right to a
non-invasive pat-down search by an officer of the same sex, a rule that would not only
be impractical, but also has no support in the jurisprudence."); Greiner v. City of
Champlin, 816 F. Supp. 528, 543 (D. Minn. 1993) ("[Plaintiffs imply] that the fact that
a male officer rather than a female officer conducted the [pat down] means a per se
constitutional violation occurred. The Court disagrees.").
58 See, e.g., ARK. ASS'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, LEGAL & LIABILITY RISK MGMT. INST., STOP,
ARREST, & SEARCH OF PERSONS 5 (2012), available at http://www.arkchiefs.org/
Portals/O/portal%20files/Model%20Policies/Model%2OPolicies/Stop%2OArrest%2Oand%2
OSearch%20of%20PersonsRev%204.23.13.doc ("When possible and practicable... pat-
downs ... will be conducted by an authorized person of the same sex as the arrestee.");
MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEP'T, CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, POLICY & PROCEDURE MANUAL § 9-200
(2013), available at http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/police/policy/mpdpolicy-9-200_9-
200 ("When practical, persons should be searched by an officer of the same gender if such
an officer is on the scene or can arrive within a reasonable period of time.").
59 WASH. ATT'Y GEN. OFFICE, LAw ENFORCEMENT LEGAL UPDATE OUTLINE 13 (2014),
available at https://fortress.wa.gov/cjtc/www/images/LE-Legal July%201%202014.pdf.
60 See, e.g., United States v. Gil, 204 F.3d 1347, 1349, 1351 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding
detention of female suspect for seventy-five minutes was not unreasonable under Terry,
where investigation was ongoing and time was needed to secure a female officer to
conduct a pat down of the suspect).
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In short, while there is some variation for reasons of practicality, in
the end, traditional notions of gender and sex are controlling: the clear
preference is for a same-gender frisk.
2. Searches Incident to Arrest
The balance between the needs of law enforcement and intrusiveness
- the classic test for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment6 -
shifts when it comes to full-scale arrests, and more specifically searches
incident to arrest. Here, where an officer makes a determination of
probable cause that the suspect has committed a criminal offense, a
more complete search is permitted. 62 By this point, the suspect has
likely already been patted down for weapons in order to ensure the
safety of the arresting officers; officers can be more thorough in
conducting a search for evidence. Under these circumstances, many
police departments, including those that allow cross-gender pat downs
for reasons of practicality, require an officer who is the same gender as
the arrestee conduct the more thorough searches incident to arrest.63
Again, New York City provides a useful example. There, where 80% of
the officers on patrol are male, cross-gender stop and frisks on the street
are permitted, but a female officer is summoned to conduct a "thorough
search" if a woman is arrested and brought to a precinct.64
3. School Searches
Traditional notions about sex and gender play a role in school search
cases as well. Consider New Jersey v. TLO,65 which held that searches
conducted by public school authorities comport with the Fourth
61 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
62 See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 225 (1973) ("The right without
a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons lawfully arrested while
committing crime and to search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and
seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was
committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect an escape from custody, is not
to be doubted."); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 756-57 (1969) (setting forth the
parameters for a search incident to arrest).
63 N.Y. POLICE DEP'T, supra note 54, § 208-5 (requiring that searches "at precinct of
arrest or other Department facility, the arresting officer (if he/she is of the same gender
as prisoner).., shall conduct a thorough search of the prisoner's person and clothing").
See L.A. POLICE DEP'T, supra note 54, § 217 (providing for an "immediate search" in the
field by "an officer of either sex," but a "thorough" search "as soon as practicable").
64 Ruderman, supra note 56, at Al.
65 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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Amendment so long as they are reasonable.66 In expounding on what it
meant by "reasonable," the Court specifically noted that one factor
should be the gender of the student:
Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher
or other school official will be "justified at its inception" when
there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will
turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating
either the law or the rules of the school. Such a search will be
permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not
excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student
and the nature of the infraction. 67
This concern about gender - at bottom a concern that a routine
search might metastasize into a sexy search - was far from incidental.
After all, the searched student in New Jersey v. TLO was a 14-year-old
girl; the school official was a male assistant vice-principal. 68 As Justice
Stevens observed in his dissent, the Court's language was "obviously
designed to prohibit physically intrusive searches of students by persons
of the opposite sex for relatively minor offenses."69 This concern is just
beneath the surface of other school search cases as well. In Vernonia
School District 47J v. Acton,70 the Court ruled that a school's policy of
conducting random urinalysis testing of student athletes did not violate
the Fourth Amendment, noting, among other things, that monitoring
was conducted by an adult the same sex as the student.7' "Under such
conditions, the privacy interests compromised by the process of
obtaining the urine sample are in our view negligible." 72 A few years
later, in Board of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottowatomie
County v. Earls, 73 the Court approved an even broader testing policy,
noting that the procedure for testing was "virtually identical" to that in
Acton.74 Finally, in the Court's most recent foray into school searches,
Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding,75 the Court again stressed
66 Id. at 341.
67 Id. at 341-42.
68 Id. at 328-29.
69 Id. at 381 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
71 Id. at 646, 650.
72 Id. at 658.
73 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
74 Id. at 825, 832.
75 557 U.S. 364 (2009).
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the importance that a search be conducted by someone of the same
gender as the student, mentioning this preference no less than three
times in the majority opinion alone. 76
4. Jails and Prisons
The issue of sex also crops up in cases addressing the monitoring of
inmates. As with stop and frisks vis-A-vis searches incident to arrest, the
intrusiveness of the search matters. Cross-gender pat downs are mostly
permitted; by contrast, cross-gender strip searches are generally
disallowed. For example, the Prisoner Rape Elimination Act ("PREA")
now permits cross-gender pat downs, 77 but prohibits cross-gender strip
searches or the cross-gender visual inspect of anal or genital body
cavities. 78
Relying on the pat down/strip search distinction in responding to
challenges grounded in the Fourth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment,
and substantive due process, several courts have ruled that inmates do
not have the right to be free from cross-gender pat downs.79 By contrast,
some courts have deemed cross-gender strip searches unconstitutional.8 0
76 See id. at 370, 375, 379. Interestingly, the school meeting this requirement was
insufficient to render the search constitutional. While the search of the 13-year-old
honor student's bookbag would have been constitutional, the school's actions in strip-
searching the student were facially unreasonable. Id. at 373-77.
77 28 C.F.R. § 115.15(f) (2014).
78 The prohibition of cross-gender strip searches does not apply to searches conducted
by medical practitioners; such strip searches may also be excused in "exigent circumstances."
See National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape; Final Rule, 77 Fed.
Reg. 37,106,37,130 (June 20, 2012) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 115).
79 See, e.g., Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 746 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding prison's
policy on cross-gender surveillance passed the Turner test and thus did not violate the
Fourth Amendment); Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1101 (8th Cir. 1990) (deferring
to prison administrators' decision "to allow pat searches on a sex-neutral basis");
Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[Rloutine pat-down
searches, which include the groin area, and which are otherwise justified by security
needs, do not violate the fourteenth amendment because a correctional officer of the
opposite gender conducts such a search."); Forde v. Zickefoose, 612 F. Supp. 2d 171,
183-84 (D. Conn. 2009) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation where prison's policy
permitted cross-gender pat downs).
80 As the Supreme Court recently noted in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders
of Burlington, the "term [strip search] is imprecise" and may refer to different things.
Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1515 (2012).
That said, the description used in another case, Dodge v. County of Orange, 282 F. Supp.
2d 41 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), serves as a useful template. Quoting from the relevant prison
manual, the case described a prison strip search as involving:
[A] visual inspection of the inmate's naked body. This should include the
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Byrd v. Maricopa County Sherriffs Department,81 a recent decision by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, is a case in point. In response
to several fights and the suspicion of contraband in a housing unit, jail
officials ordered the search of all of the unit's inmates (approximately
ninety). Cadets from a detention center training academy, together with
their supervisors, carried out the searches.82 O'Connell, the cadet
assigned to strip search inmate Charles Byrd, happened to be female.8 3
The opinion describes the search this way:
O'Connell ordered him to turn away from her, spread his feet
and raise his arms above his head. Wearing latex rubber gloves,
she pulled out Byrd's waistband a few inches and felt the
waistband to make sure nothing was hidden in it. O'Connell did
not look inside Byrd's boxer shorts.
Next, O'Connell placed her hand on Byrd's lower back holding
the back part of the boxer shorts and, with her other hand,
searched over his boxer shorts, his outer thigh from his hip to
the bottom of the shorts. She then moved her hand from his
outer thigh to the bottom of the shorts on his inner thigh and
applied slight pressure to feel his inner thigh for contraband.
Using the back of her hand, O'Connell moved Byrd's penis and
scrotum out of the way applying slight pressure to search the
area. O'Connell then searched the other side using the same
technique.84
Tellingly, the Ninth Circuit found that a strip search itself was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment given the circumstances.8 5
However, the court concluded this strip search was unreasonable
inmate opening his mouth and moving his tongue up and down and from side
to side, removing any dentures, running his hands through his hair, allowing
his ears to be visually examined, lifting his arms to expose his arm pits, lifting
his feet to examine the sole, spreading and/or lifting his testicles to expose the
area behind them and bending over and/or spreading the cheeks of his
buttocks to expose his anus. For females, the procedures are similar except
females must in addition, squat to expose the vagina.
Id. at 46 (internal citation omitted). A visual depiction of a strip search can be found on the
ACLU's website. See Prison Strip Search is Sexually Abusive, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/
prisoners-rights-womens-rights/prison-strip-search-sexually-abusive (last visited Aug. 23,
2014).
81 629 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2011).
82 Id. at 1136-37.
83 Id. at 1137.
84 Id.
85 See id. at 1143.
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because it was cross-gender. 86 The Ninth Circuit accordingly ruled for
the petitioner, finding that the cross-gender strip search was
unreasonable, and thus violated his Fourth Amendment rights, "as a
matter of law."87
There are three more points to be made about sexy searches in the
context of jails and prisons. One, preferences for same-gender searches
sometimes conflict with the obligation of employers to not discriminate
on the basis of sex.88 For the most part, when female correctional
employees have presented claims that policies prohibiting them from
searching male inmates limit their job advancement prospects, courts
have urged accommodation.8 9 For example, in Hardin v. Stynchcomb,90
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit directed a jail to
accommodate female deputy-sheriffs so that they could be excused from
conducting strip searches of male inmates without it adversely
impacting evaluations of their job performance. 91
Two, prison seems to be the area where a preference for same-gender
searches is the weakest and in fact gender-dependent. Notwithstanding
86 Id.
87 Id. at 1142.
88 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2013).
89 See, e.g., Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 188 (7th Cir. 1994) (concluding that
respect for inmate privacy is a "constitutional mandate"); Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d
52, 55 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting that the "resulting conflict between [the privacy rights
of inmates and equal employment right of guards] has normally been resolved by
attempting to accommodate both interests through adjustments in scheduling and job
responsibilities for the guards"); Bowling v. Enomoto, 514 F. Supp. 201, 204 (N.D. Cal.
1981) (allowing prison officials to propose procedure to accommodate both privacy
interests and equal employment interests); see also Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses
and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 147,
182 (2004) (observing that "courts often require prisons to restructure jobs to permit
women to do them without violating inmate privacy").
90 691 F.2d 1364 (11th Cir. 1982).
91 See id. at 1373-74. Other courts have also required, or approved of,
accommodation to avoid the conflict between the equal employment rights of prison
employees, and the "right" to same-gender privacy of inmates. E.g., Gunther v. Iowa
State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1087 (8th Cir. 1980) (finding that
"administrative changes have allowed plaintiff to perform... functions without unduly
disrupting the system or invading inmate privacy"); Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 1216
(2d Cir. 1980) ("In protecting the inmates' privacy at the prison hospital, the judge
prohibited the stationing of male guards at locations where inmates could be viewed
completely or partially unclothed."); Everson v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 222 F. Supp. 2d
864, 899 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (encouraging the creation of "gender specific task
assignments"); Griffin v. Mich. Dep't of Corrs., 654 F. Supp. 690, 705 (E.D. Mich. 1982)
(federal courts have resolved the conflict by "ordering the inmates or employees to alter
their daily routines" or "required the employer to alter work assignment policies .
(internal citations omitted)).
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the Ninth Circuit's concern in Byrd, the fact is that many courts have
held that inmates do not have the right to be free from cross-gender
searches, especially male inmates. 92 As Teresa Miller succinctly put it,
because "women are precisely the group that judges seek to protect
when they determine the scope of privacy in the context of cross-gender
searches," 93 men are treated differently. "When male prisoners invoke
privacy doctrine for protection against unwanted intrusions upon their
bodies by guards of the opposite sex, they frequently run into doctrinal
roadblocks."94
Three, while the issue of cross-gender searches in jails and prisons
may be of little concern to most citizens, two Supreme Court cases make
clear that this issue is not as remote as many citizens might assume. In
Atwater v. Lago Vista,95 the Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment did
not bar an officer from handcuffing, arresting, and holding a mother of
two in jail for failing to secure her children in seatbelts, a traffic
violation. So long as "an officer has probable cause to believe that an
individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his
presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the
offender." 96 And more recently, in Florence v. Board of Chosen
Freeholders,97 the Court ruled that jails may conduct strip searches and
visually inspect the body cavities of all arrestees committed to the
general population, including inmates arrested for minor offenses. 98 In
combination, these cases suggest that even a traffic violator may one day
find herself being arrested and strip searched.
92 See, e.g., Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1526 (9th Cir. 1993) (concluding
that a different result was justified because "women experience unwanted intimate
touching by men differently from men subject to comparable touching by women");
Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 961-62 (7th Cir. 1983) (explaining that female
correction officers' rights for equal employment support them doing searches on male
prisoners); Bagley v. Watson, 579 F. Supp. 1099, 1103-04 (D. Or. 1983) (holding that
male inmates had no constitutional right to be free from bodily observation from female
guards).
93 Teresa A. Miller, Keeping the Government's Hands Off Our Bodies: Mapping a
Feminist Legal Theory Approach to Privacy in Cross-Gender Prison Searches, 4 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 861, 865 (2001).
94 Id. at 863.
95 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
96 Id. at 354.
97 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).
98 Id. at 1518-23.
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5. Airports
Even if being arrested for a traffic violation and strip searched still
seems remote to most citizens, there is another Fourth Amendment
search that is decidedly gendered and that many Americans are
subjected to on a routine basis: airport searches. 99 Relying on the Fourth
Amendment's "special needs" doctrine, which permits suspicionless
searches where the primary purpose is something other than traditional
criminal law enforcement,100 courts have routinely upheld airport
security checks as permissible searches.' 0 '
Although much of the initial concern about search procedures
instituted post-9/11 involved racial profiling, 102 the more recent
complaint, especially with the introduction of whole body scanners in
99 By statute, TSA is required to screen passengers and property entering security
controlled area of airports. See 49 U.S.C. § 44901 (2013).
100 On special needs searches generally, see JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 18.05 (4th ed. 2006).
101 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
INVESTIGATIVE CASES AND COMMENTARY 423 (9th ed. 2010). As Stephen Saltzburg and
Dan Capra put it in their discussion of airport searches:
[Airport security searches have been] found reasonable because: 1) the state
interest in protecting the safety of air travel was high; 2) the state interest
could not be accommodated by limiting the searches to those who were
reasonably suspected of presenting a safety risk-suspicionless searches were
required because some travelers may pose a safety risk even though they have
no intent to violate the law (e.g., a security officer carrying a weapon that
might be stolen on board by a highjacker), and because some people might
not look suspicious on a cursory view but in fact may be intending to highjack
or blow up an airplane; and 3) the searches are minimally intrusive, because
a) all travelers are searched (minimizing the humiliation), b) travelers are
notified in advance, and c) travelers are free to refuse the search and choose
some other form of travel.
Id. Courts have applied the "special needs" doctrine to specifically find pat down and
similar individualized searches constitutional. See, e.g., United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d
955 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding a wand search when "No ID" written on boarding pass);
United States v. Hartwell 436 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2006) (upholding wand search); United
States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding random wand search and
pat down); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973) (acknowledging the
constitutionality of airport searches if certain conditions are met, such as consent or
implied consent).
102 See, e.g., Sharon L. Davies, Profiling Terror, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 45 (2003)
(recognizing that enhanced surveillance of Arab looking men occurs at airports); Leti
Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002) (arguing that racial
profiling has contributed to the removal of many Middle Eastern looking men from
airline flights).
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2010,103 has been about risk of searches becoming sexual. Early on,
critics described whole body scans as "a virtual strip search" producing
"naked" pictures of passengers. 10 4 That TSA regulations required
passengers refusing scans to undergo a more probing pat down'0 5 - the
new procedures involve touching areas on the thigh and groin area, as
well as buttocks10 6 - increased privacy concerns. 10 7 The procedures
even sparked a "Don't Touch My Junk" movement after a passenger
posted a YouTube video of himself refusing a body scan and telling a
TSA screener, "If you touch my junk, I'm gonna have you arrested."'0 8
Responding to public pressure, in early 2013 TSA announced that it
would phase out its naked-body scanners, 109 and replace them with
machines that use privacy-protecting Automated Target Recognition
software.110
103 BART ELIAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL41502, CHANGES IN AIRPORT PASSENGER
SCREENING TECHNOLOGIES AND PROCEDURES: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 2 (2011),
available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesecR41502.pdf. TSA refers to the body scan
procedures as advanced imaging technology and describes it as capturing an image of
what lies underneath an individual's clothing. Id. at 1. Passengers who decline the scans
may opt for a pat-down search instead. Id.
104 See, e.g., Jessica Ravitz, Airport Security Bares All, or Does It?, CNN (May 18, 2009,
1:36 PM), http://www.cnn.con2009iTRAVEU05/18/airport.security.body.scans/index.
html ("Homeland Security to suspend use of 'whole-body imaging,' the airport security
technology that critics say performs 'a virtual strip search' and produces 'naked' pictures
of passengers.").
105 See ELIAS, supra note 103, at 5.
106 Id.
107 Susan Stellin, Too Close for Comfort, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2010, at BI (noting,
among other things, that male and female passengers seemed equally bothered by
searches).
108 McGreal, supra note 3 (describing "revolt" resulting from John Tyner's refusal).
A video of Tyner's refusal has been viewed over 350,000 times on YouTube.
O0stonedagain0o, DON'T 'TOUCH MY JUNK' John Tyner - ORIGINAL TSA FULL
encounter, YoUTUBE (Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-UqM56e-
kRA, available at http://web.archive.org/web/2013053 1063858/http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=-UqM56e-kRA. Other videos of the encounter have been viewed over
13,000 times. See, e.g., CNN, CNN: John Tyner to TSA Security: "Don't Touch My Junk,"
YoUTUBE (Nov. 17, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Laxmx4cE3aE.
109 Mike M. Ahlers, TSA Removing 'Virtual Strip Search' Body Scanners, CNN (Jan. 19,
2013, 1:08 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/18/travel/tsa-body-scanners.
110 Id.; see Bart Jansen, TSA Dumps Near-Naked Rapiscan Body Scanners, USA TODAY
(Jan. 18, 2013, 3:48 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/flights/2013/01/18/
naked-airport-scanners/1845851/; Ron Nixon, Unpopular Full-Body Scanners to Be
Removed from Airports, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2013, at All.
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But even with the phasing out of naked body scanners, the issue of
pat downs remains, and with it the issue of cross-gender pat downs. TSA
policy prohibits, absent passenger consent, cross-gender pat downs."i '
As the foregoing should make clear, when it comes to searches -
from Terry frisks to school searches to prison surveillance to airport
security - traditional notions of gender and sex matter. They matter in
that they inform official policy, and they matter in that they inform
Fourth Amendment reasonableness determinations.
For many, if we are going to permit bodily searches at all, they should
be same-gender searches. This accords with intuition and normatively
seems right. The next Part challenges this view.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH SEX
That traditional notions of sex and gender should play a role in
whether a search is reasonable may strike many as perfectly logical and
natural. After all, the thinking might go, the sexes are different.1 2 More
than that, we are used to gender segregation, so much so that it often
goes unquestioned. If we segregate restrooms along the line of gender,
after all, then should not we also segregate how we conduct searches?
According to this point of view, this language from the Ninth Circuit
seems right: "The desire to shield one's unclothed figure from [the] view
III See Joe Sharkey, Business Travel: Despite a Longstanding Policy of Same-Sex
Screenings, Charges of Airport Groping Continue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2002, at CIt. A
similar same-gender preference seems to be reflected in border searches. See, e.g., United
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985) (emphasizing that a "female
inspector" conducted the strip search of Hernandez, a female traveler from Colombia
suspected of smuggling narcotics).
112 That the sexes are biologically different, and that this difference explains a host
of other characteristics (such as reasoning) and outcomes (job advancement), has been
the argument of several legal scholars, including Richard Posner and Richard Epstein.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 91 (1992); Richard A. Epstein, Gender is for
Nouns, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 981, 985 (1992); see also CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 7 (1982). At least one court
has relied on biological differences in its consideration of same-sex searches. As the
court put it, "The biological difference between men and women which in turn
lproduces] psychological differences are the facts that justify limiting personal contact
under intimate circumstances to those of the same sex." Phila. v. Pa. Human Relations
Comm'n, 300 A.2d 97, 103 n.7 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
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of strangers, and particularly strangers of the opposite sex, is impelled
by elementary self-respect and personal dignity." 113
From the point of view of many women, even disparate treatment -
in the form of having a strong aversion to cross-gender searches of
women, but a weak aversion to cross-gender searches of men - makes
sense. 114 For many women, a cross-gender pat down of a woman is by
definition sexual,11 and thus raises the threat of being sexually
assaultive. 116 From this point of view, it is one thing to allow women to
search men. It is another thing entirely to permit men to search women.
This viewpoint informs current policy in many prisons,117 and has
informed how courts have analyzed the reasonableness of searches
under the Fourth Amendment.118
The goal of this Part is to trouble this way of thinking. My argument
is unconventional, to be sure, invoking not only Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, but also employment discrimination law and feminist
theory. My argument is also unconventional insofar as it ranges from
gender-based preferences on maternity wards and airplanes to counter-
stereotypical sexual assaults in the military and in prisons.
That said, the argument I make in this Part can be stated succinctly.
One, to regulate cross-gender searches is to engage in sex stereotyping
and to erase sexual difference. Two, the sex stereotyping is not even
accurate stereotyping. Three, it caters to sex-based individual
preferences and undermines our anti-discrimination principles. As I
113 Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriffs Dep't, 629 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2011)
(quoting York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963)).
114 For example, in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), the Independent
Women's Forum filed an amicus brief defending the Virginia Military Institute's right
to refuse admission to women, arguing that differences between men and women are
"real and substantial." See Brief for Independent Women's Forum et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107), 1995 WL
745003, at *3.
115 As one woman who was stopped and frisked in New York put it, "A male officer
should not have a right to touch me in any sort of manner, even if it's on the outside of
my clothing .... We're girls. They are men. And they are cops. It feels like a way for
them to exert power over you." Ruderman, supra note 56, at Al (internal quotation
marks omitted).
116 See generally Cathy Pereira, Strip Searching as Sexual Assault, 27 HECATE 187 (2001),
available at http://www.d.umn.edu/cla/faculty/jhamlin/3925/Readings/stripsearches.pdf.
117 See, e.g., Yuracko, supra note 89, at 182 (noting that courts "are more permissive
of attempts by women's prisons to exclude male guards" than male prisons to exclude
female guards). Yuracko adds, "This is probably the case both because the combined
privacy and safety concerns of the female inmates seem stronger than the privacy
concerns of the male inmates and because the threatened loss of overall job
opportunities for men is less severe." Id.
118 See infra notes 159-76 and accompanying text.
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demonstrate below, each of these arguments standing alone should
merit reconsideration of the reliance on traditional notions of sex and
gender in Fourth Amendment reasonableness determinations and
government policy more broadly. But it is their collective valence that
is even more important. Collectively, these arguments demonstrate that
reliance on gender categories as proxies obscures very real power
imbalances. They suggest as well that a consideration of sex and gender
in determining reasonableness undermines bedrock notions of equality.
A. Sex Stereotyping
One of the main arguments raised in support of barring cross-gender
searches is that it is particularly harmful to women, who may experience
cross-gender searches as sexual violations.119 As a recent New York
Times headline put it, "For Women in Street Stops, A Deeper
Humiliation."'20 The argument is raised in a range of searches, from
Terry frisks to airport pat downs to prison strip searches and school
searches. As Justice Ginsburg famously remarked about her fellow
Justices after the Court decided Redding, "They have never been a 13-
year-old girl.... It's a very sensitive age for a girl."' 21 The language used
in prison searches is particularly revealing. For example, one article
describes the strip-searching of female inmates as "state sanctioned
sexual assault,"122 a claim it supports by quoting several female inmates:
119 Amy Kapczynski makes a similar point in her discussion of employment
discrimination cases involving attempts to limit employment to one sex to ensure the
privacy of customers. Kapczynski notes, "In all same-sex privacy cases, I would
contend, anxiety about cross-sex bodily contact and viewing in some sense reflects fears
and realities of sexual abuse or harassment." Amy Kapczynski, Same-Sex Privacy and the
Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 112 YALE L.J. 1257, 1280 (2003).
120 Ruderman, supra note 56, at Al.
121 Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg: Court Needs Another Woman, USA TODAY, May 6, 2009,
at IA (internal quotation marks omitted); Adam Liptak, Strip Search of Girl by School
Officials Seeking Drugs Was Illegal, Justices Rule, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2009, at A16. By
contrast, Justice Scalia has assumed that boys, at least those who play sports, are more
comfortable with "communal undress." See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646, 657 (1995) (observing that there is "an element of 'communal undress' inherent in
athletic participation"). Judge Posner would appear to have a similar feeling about
manly men. See DeClue v. Cent. Ill. Light Co., 223 F.3d 434,436 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Male
linemen have never felt any inhibitions about urinating in the open, as it were. They do
not interrupt their work to go in search of a public restroom. Women are more reticent
about urinating in public than men."). Of course, theJustices and the judge are engaging
in stereotypes here and conflating nature with culture. Even more troubling, there is a
disturbing normative message: girls ought to be demure and traumatized by the thought
of exposing their bodies and "real boys" should be boys and not mind at all.
122 Pereira, supra note 116, at 187.
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I honestly felt the only way to prevent the search becoming
more intrusive or sexual was to remain as quiet and docile as
possible. I later wondered why I was so passive. All I could
answer was that it was an experience similar to sexual assault. I
felt the same helplessness, the same abuse by a male in
authority, the same sense of degradation and lack of escape.
I was never allowed to forget that, being a prisoner, even my
body was not my own .... I was compelled to submit to be
undressed and searched.
I have reluctantly tolerated strip searching whenever I have had
to . . . . It is utterly degrading, humiliating and frankly
disgusting .... I cannot imagine what it feels like for women
who have been abused.
On the one had you would feel great about [having a] visit but
really raped and angry about the strip search afterwards. It was
impossible to "get used to it" or "switch off from it" or be
objective to it. In fact some women preferred not to have a visit
because they couldn't handle the strip search afterwards.123
These concerns are not without merit. However, they do deserve
further scrutiny. Perhaps most problematic, this line of thinking
engages in precisely the same type of sex stereotyping that feminists
have fought hard to eradicate. It stereotypes women as vulnerable
victims, reifying a trope that many feminists have long fought to retire.
It casts women "as constitutively vulnerable to sexualized attack, and as
essentially and necessarily modest in a way that resonates with
tendencies to propertize women and deny them sexual agency." 124
To be clear, the sexual assault of women is real. But the leap from the
observation that women are subject to sexual assault to the conclusion
that cross-gender searches should be prohibited is a large leap indeed.
It is also a retrogressive one. It casts women not only as likely targets of
sexual harassment, but also as likely victims. By this, I mean that it
stereotypes women as likely to experience cross-gender searches as
sexually assaultive, debilitating, and paralyzing. It evokes the image of
123 Id. at 188.
124 Kapczynski, supra note 119, at 1262.
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woman as the archetypal victim, 25 as the weaker sex, and trades on her
designation as sexual object. 126 It relies on the trope of female trauma,
once invoked by feminists to secure legal reforms, but as Jeannie Suk
recently observed, is now co-opted by others to paternalistically cabin
women's sexuality. 127 It brings to mind the outdated thinking of cases
like Muller v. Oregon,128 which deemed women as fragile beings
"needing especial care,"' 29 and Bradwell v. Illinois,130 which touted the
"natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female
sex."'13 1 This thinking is of a piece with Justice Scalia's recasting the
modern woman, in the Fourth Amendment case Kyllo v. United
States, 32 as "the lady of the house takfing] her daily sauna and bath,"
125 Cynthia Godsoe, Punishing to Protect: The Pitfalls of Punitive Paternalism 39
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
126 JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM
346 (2006). In an exchange with other writers, Halley adds:
So much feminist rape discourse insists on women's object-like status in the
rape situation: man fucks woman - subject verb object. Could feminism be
contributing to, rather than resisting, the alienation of women from their own
agency in narratives and events of sexual violence?
Brenda Cossman & Janet Halley et al., Gender, Sexuality, and Power: Is Feminist Theory
Enough?, 12 COLUM.J. GENDER& L. 601, 610-11 (2003).
127 Jeannie Suk, The Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies and Minds of Abortion Discourse,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1195-97 (2010); see also Victoria Baranetsky, Aborting
Dignity: The Abortion Doctrine After Gonzalez v. Carhart, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 123,
127 (2013) (observing that Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Gonzalez v. Carhart,
550 U.S. 134 (2007) relies on the idea that women are by nature maternal and thus
likely to suffer trauma when they lose an offspring, and on "Victorian notions of women
as the weaker sex").
128 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). In Muller, the Court upheld as
constitutional an Oregon statute that limited to ten hours a day the working hours of
women employed in any mechanical establishment, factory, or laundry. Id. at 423. It
made no difference that the Court had recently, and quite famously, decided Lochner v.
New York, invalidating an analogous statute involving men on the ground that it
violated the due process right and liberty of individuals to contract their labor. Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 62-64 (1905). The Muller Court observed:
That woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal functions
place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious .... [As
such], she has been looked upon in the courts as needing especial care that
her rights may be preserved.
Muller, 208 U.S. at 421.
129 Muller, 208 U.S. at 421.
130 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (upholding a law that forbade women to practice
law).
131 Id. at 141 (Bradley,J., concurring).
132 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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and thus in need of protection from the eyes of G-Men. t33 Indeed, this
thinking brings to mind antiquated notions about a woman's value
being in her sexual purity; quite literally, in the fact that she has not
been touched by the opposite sex.134
Second, any policy or judicial preference for same-gender searches, in
order to protect women, stereotypes men. To borrow from Amy
Kapczynski, it is nothing short of "sexual profiling."135 It prefigures men
as sexual predators, incapable of controlling their sexual urges, and
incapable of conducting an authorized search within the parameters of
the law. It buys into the notion that all men are potential rapists, 136 and
indeed adds to its currency. Two things are particularly troubling about
such stereotyping. One, we apply this stereotype not only to men in
general, but also to men who are police officers, school officials,
corrections officers, and TSA employees. Stated differently, it seems
strange that we paint with the same broad-brush individuals who are
ethically and professionally obligated to protect us, and in whom we
have entrusted such protection. 137 Two, it is particularly troubling that
133 Id. at 38. For discussion, see Jeannie Suk, Is Privacy a Woman?, 97 GEO. L.J. 485,
487-91 (2009) [hereinafter Is Privacy a Woman?]. In concluding that the use of a
thermal imaging device to detect heat emanating from a private home was a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, Justice Scalia expressly relied on the
home as castle metaphor before pivoting to his imagining "the lady of the house" in the
sauna. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38. As I have noted previously, "Iflollowing the home as a
castle metaphor, one wonders why Justice Scalia did not simply invoke the figure of the
master sitting on the proverbial throne." I. Bennett Capers, Home Is Where the Crime Is,
109 MICH. L. REV. 979, 984 (2011).
134 See Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual
Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 77 n.127 (2002)
(collecting cases discussing the chastity of women); Capers, Real Women, Real Rape,
supra note 14, at 829; Godsoe, supra note 125, at 8; see also Corey Rayburn, Better Dead
than R(ap)ed?: The Patriarchal Rhetoric Driving Capital Rape Statutes, 78 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 1119, 1165 (2004). It also brings to mind Hebraic and Muslim teachings requiring
that women keep their bodies covered, which too, stand in tension with progressive
notions of unconditional gender equality.
135 Kapczynski, supra note 119, at 1274.
136 See, e.g., Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men! A Feminist Analysis of Character Evidence
in Rape Trials, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 663, 692 (1998) (suggesting that feminists view rape as
"a crime of opportunity as much as a test of character" of all men); see also Patricia
Searles & Ronald J. Berger, Why Men Rape, in RAPE AND SOCIETY: READINGS ON THE
PROBLEM OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 1,51 (Patricia Searles & RonaldJ. Berger eds., 1995); Owen
D. Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape: Toward Explanation and Prevention, 87
CALIF. L. REV. 827, 839-40 (1999).
137 That such searches normally occur in public or semi-public areas should also
reduce the risk of impropriety. Cf. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 204 (2002)
(noting that "a reasonable person may feel even more secure in his or her decision not
to cooperate with police on a bus [surrounded by fellow passengers] than in other
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so many of us who have fought against the reliance on gender-based
stereotypes - in education,1 38 in employment, 139 in criminal law 40 -
would so casually stereotype men. 41 If it is wrong, as a matter of law,
to use sex as a proxy for physical strength142 - think UAW v. Johnson
Controls;43 think United States v. Virginia144 - then it should also be
wrong to use sex as a proxy for vulnerability in the case of women, or
sexual aggressiveness in the case of men.
In the end, though, this stereotyping of men as sexual predators and
women as vulnerable victims only begins to capture the range of
stereotype harms associated with juridical and policy preferences for
same-gender searches. For starters, this preference renders transgender
individuals invisible, failing to consider the special issues that attend a
same-gender requirement for transgender individuals. 45 It also assumes
circumstances"); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976) (noting
that "[tihe regularized manner in which established [traffic] checkpoints are operated
is visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the stops are duly
authorized and believed to serve the public interest").
138 See, e.g., Faulkner v. Jones, 66 F.3d 661 (4th Cir. 1995) (refusing to grant a stay
on a case dealing with a Citadel as a co-educational institution).
139 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that gender
played a role in petitioner's employment); see also I. Bennett Capers, Sex(ual
Orientation) and Title VII, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1158, 1158 (1991).
140 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (ruling it
impermissible to strike jurors on the basis of sex or sex-based stereotypes).
141 For me, this is on par with feminists who insist that gender should have no role
in employment decisions, and yet in their own lives chafe at the notion of hiring a male
nanny or giving birth in a maternity ward where there are male nurses.
142 David Cruz observes, "[T] here are exceptionally physically strong women and
physically weak men, sensitive men and tough-as-nails women, men and women who
are superb chefs, and men and women who cannot manage to boil water." David B.
Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1003 (2002).
143 499 U.S. 187, 202 (1991) (discussing the narrow exception to discrimination
based on gender because of potential security concerns).
144 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that physical training is not sufficient to prevent
women from attending VM).
145 For a discussion of such issues, see Margaret Colgate Love & Giovanna Shay,
Gender and Sexuality in the ABA Standards on the Treatment of Prisoners, 38 WM.
MITCHELLL. REV. 1216, 1236-38 (2012); and Darren Rosenblum, "Trapped" in SingSing:
Transgendered Prisoners Caught in the Gender Binarism, 6 MIcH.J. GENDER & L. 499,500-
03 (2000). Thinking about same-gender searches in the case of transgender individuals
also shows its limitations. Given the continuum of genders, which "gender" should
search RuPaul, or Chastity Bono, or the rapper Big Freedia? Cf. Will Oremus, Here Are
All the Different Genders You Can Be on Facebook, SLATE (Feb. 13, 2014, 3:03 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future tense/2014/02/13/facebook custom-gender-option
s here are all 56 custom-options.html (describing over fifty gender options). Or
consider the case of the transgender male fired from his job monitoring men urinating
at a drug treatment center because he was not born male. See Richard Perez-Pena, In
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that both the person conducting the search, and the person being
searched, are heterosexual, effectively erasing sexual difference,146
dismissing the sexual fluidity Lisa Diamond has written so eloquently
about, 47 and furthering a type of "gender imperialism. " 148
Along similar lines, creating policy or determining Fourth Amendment
reasonableness on the basis of notions of male aggressiveness and female
vulnerability erases other victims. Consider the claim that permitting
cross-gender surveillance of women is comparable to sexual assault and
re-traumatizes sexual assault victims. 149 While this claim is valid, it fails
to acknowledge mounting evidence about male sexual victimization.
Although male sexual victimization is usually confined to "the margins,
the footnotes, and indeed the closet,"'150 in fact "while rape is often done
by men, it is also done to men."' 51 Reports further suggest that one in
thirty-three men in the United States has been the victim of rape or
attempted rape. 152 Even in the military, where sexual assaults on women
New Jersey, ajob Discrimination Lawsuit's Unusual Question: Who is a Man?, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 11, 2011, at A18.
146 As one court observed in discussing the same-sex privacy defense in an
employment discrimination case, the regulation of intimate contact between genders
appears "to assume that all of the relevant actors are heterosexual." Canedy v.
Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 185 n.1 (7th Cir. 1994). Kapczynski makes a similar point:
Same-sex sexual privacy doctrine participates in the closeting of
homosexuality because it presumes everyone to experience their gender, their
sexuality, and their bodies in the same way, the "right" way. The insistent
heterosexual presumption behind the same-sex-as-private norm is insensible
to the history and mechanics of homophobia, and also to any interests in
cross-sex sexual privacy that individuals might have.
Kapczynski, supra note 119, at 1287. Indeed, the assumption of heterosexuality is just
one of the many ways in which the law has contributed, at least historically, to what
Adrienne Rich famously called a type of "compulsory heterosexuality." Adrienne Rich,
Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, 5 SIGNS 631, 633 (1980).
147 LISA M. DIAMOND, SEXUAL FLUIDITY: UNDERSTANDING WOMEN'S LOVE AND DESIRE
202-03 (2008). It also dismisses the possibility of bisexuality, thus participating in what
Kenji Yoshino calls the "epistemic contract of bisexual erasure." See Kenji Yoshino, The
Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353, 361-62 (2000).
148 The term "gender imperialism" comes from Katharine Bartlett. See Katharine T.
Bartlett, Gender Law, 1 DUKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1, 16-17 (1994). 1 use it here to
reference feminist thinking that assumes, and gives primacy to, heterosexuality.
149 See supra notes 112-44 and accompanying text.
150 1. Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1308 (2011) [hereinafter
Real Rape Too].
151 Id. at 1278.
152 See MICHAEL R. RAND, BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, NCJ-
227777, CRIME VICTIMIZATION, 2008, at 4 (Sept. 2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.
gov/content/pub/pdf/cv08.pdf.
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have gained much attention, male victimization is significant. In fact, of
the 26,000 reports of unwanted sexual assault in the military in 2012,
53% involved sexual attacks on men, mostly by other men.1 53 As the New
York Times has reported, the "majority of service members who are
sexually assaulted each year are men." 154 In short, the fact that a growing
number of men have been sexually victimized, mostly by other men,
undercuts part of the rationale for same-gender searches. Given this
background, it is not surprising that, as Paul Butler has written, many
men experience even same-sex searches as sexual,155 or that the "Don't
Touch My Junk" movement was initiated by a searched male, 156 or that
even Justice Scalia has expressed unease with the "indignity" suffered by
men during a pat-down. 157
All of these problems involve stereotypes of one sort or another. More
significantly, all of these problems show how same-gender searches
reify gender distinctions at a time when we aspire to gender equality.
Rather than undoing gender, these preferences are constitutive in the
production and reproduction of gender distinctions.
B. Sex Stereotyping Contradicted by Reality
There is a related problem to that of stereotyping. The stereotype -
that casts men as sexual aggressors and women as vulnerable victims -
falsely simplifies interactions that are far more complex. Indeed, when
153 James Dao, In Debate Over Military Sexual Assault, Men Are Overlooked Victims,
N.Y. TIMES,June 24, 2013, at A12.
154 Id.
155 Paul Butler, Stop and Frisk: Sex, Torture, Control, in LAW AS PUNISHMENT/LAW AS
REGULATION 155,166 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2011); see also Kristen Gwynne, How 'Stop
and Frisk' Is Too Often a Sexual Assault by Cops on Teenagers in Targeted NYC
Neighborhoods, ALTERNET (Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.alternet.org/civil-liberties/how-
stop-and-frisk-too-often-sexual-assault-cops-teenagers-targeted-nyc.
156 See McGreal, supra note 3.
157 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366,381 (1993) (Scalia,J., dissenting)
(expressing doubt whether "the fiercely proud men who adopted our Fourth
Amendment" would have allowed themselves to be subjected "to such indignity" as
being frisked on mere suspicion of being armed and dangerous). It is also telling that in
Powell v. Barrett, 511 F. App'x 957,963-64 (11th Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. Matkin
v. Barrett, 134 S. Ct. 513, 514 (2014), the case holding that jail officials may strip search
any admitted inmate as part of a routine intake process, Petitioner Evans complained
that his same-gender body cavity search made him feel "less than a man." Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at 6, Matkin, 134 S. Ct. 513 (No. 13-108), 2013 WE 3856377, at *6;
see Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Ruling Allows Strip Searches for Any Arrest, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 2, 2012, at A16. For an interesting take on how male victims feel "less than a man,"
see Mary Anne Franks, How to Feel Like a Woman, or Why Punishment Is a Drag, 61
UCLA L. REV. 566, 569-72 (2014).
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examined closely, such assumptions about male-female interactions are
often wrong. Consider a Terry stop, or better yet, an airport security pat
down of a traveler. In favoring same-gender searches, we conveniently
sidestep the fact that men may be sexually victimized by other men, and
that women may be sexually victimized by other women. This is
particularly evident when it comes to limiting cross-gender pat downs
and surveillance in prison. As noted earlier, although inmates are
arguably the least protected from cross-gender searches, the trend has
been to discourage such searches, especially of female inmates. 158
Simply put, in determining whether a search is "reasonable" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, courts continue to rely on
stereotypes about "how men are" (sexually aggressive) and "how
women are" (vulnerable victims). But as a growing number of scholars
are demonstrating, actual data contradict these assumptions.
Consider the evidence from women's prisons. The assumption for
women's prisons is that, like a scene from the Orange is the New Black
in which an officer dubbed "Pornstache" gropes a female inmate, "the
main threat of sexual abuse comes from male guards. '" 159 Data contradict
this assumption. While sexual abuse from male staff does exist, recent
data reveal that the far greater threat of sexual abuse comes other
women, specifically female inmates. 160 Surveys uniformly show that
women inmates report twice as much female-on-female sexual
victimization as victimization by male staff.161
The evidence of sexual abuse from men's prisons and jails is equally
counter-stereotypical. To be sure, there is male-on-male sexual
violence.162 This alone throws a wrench into the narrative that women,
not men, are vulnerable. Mounting evidence complicates this picture
even more. Growing evidence suggests that women can be, and often
are, sexually aggressive, too. Kim Shayo Buchanan observes:
[Diespite the focus of prison rape discourse on fellow inmates
as the source of sexual threat in men's prisons, these surveys
found that incarcerated men report much higher rates of sexual
abuse by staff than by fellow inmates, and found that a large
majority of staff perpetrators of sexual abuse are women .... In
158 See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
159 Kim Shayo Buchanan, Engendering Rape, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1630, 1635 (2012).
160 Id. at 1639; see also ALLEN J. BECK & PAIGE M. HARRISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ-231169, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN PRISONS AND
JAILS REPORTED BY INMATES, 2008-2009, at 12 tbl.6 (Aug. 2010), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/svpjri0809.pdf.
161 Buchanan, supra note 159, at 1639 n.15.
162 Capers, Real Rape Too, supra note 150, at 1278-88.
[Vol. 48:855
Unsexing the Fourth Amendment
total, 85 percent of male inmates who had had sex with staff
reported a female perpetrator. 163
Quite simply, "since the publication of the first methodologically
rigorous victimization surveys in 2007 and 2008, the results have
consistently pointed to women staff as the main perpetrators of sexual
victimization in jails and prisons for men." 164 Of course, sexual
victimization may take many forms, as female soldier Lynndie England's
sexual torture of male Abu Ghraib prisoners should remind us. 165
In short, there is an abundance of data that should call into question
societal stereotypes about how men are and how women are,
stereotypes which are then used to justify an aversion to cross-gender
searches. Still, I can imagine the hesitation. So allow me to conclude
this section with an area of Fourth Amendment law that is likely
familiar to most of us: traffic stops. Traffic stops provide a useful
discussion point in the Fourth Amendment context in part because they
occur so frequently and, in part, because officers have almost unfettered
discretion in how to conduct the stop. So long as an officer has probable
cause to believe there is a traffic violation - for example, driving six
miles above the speed limit,166 or failing to signal a lane change167 -
that officer can conduct a traffic stop. What is most important here is
163 Buchanan, supra note 159, at 1646-47. More than 40% of the surveyed inmates
described their sexual encounters with female staff members as "unwilling" on their
part. See ALLEN J. BECK & CANDACE JOHNSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, NCJ-237363, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION REPORTED BY FORMER STATE PRISONERS,
2008, at 15 tbl.7 (May 2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
svrfsp08.pdf. More than 35% of men in prisons said that sex with staff involved either
force or the threat of force. BECK & HARRISON, supra note 160, at 23 tbl.17. Indeed, even
among the inmates who described their sexual encounters with staff as willing, many
acknowledged that they had been "pressured" into it. As such, "survey data provide
considerable evidence of coercion in both 'willing' and 'unwilling' sex between staff and
inmates of all genders." Buchanan, supra note 159, at 1655.
164 Buchanan, supra note 159, at 1673.
165 See Jamie R. Abrams, The Collateral Consequences of Masculinizing Violence, 16
WM. & MARYJ. WOMEN & L. 703, 719-20 (2010); Aziza Ahmed, When Men Are Harmed:
Feminism, Queer Theory, and Torture at Abu Ghraib, 11 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 1,
8-9 (2012). For more on this sexual torture and the firestorm that ensued, see Seymour
M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, THE NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004, at 42-47.
166 This was the basis for the stop in Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 421 (2005).
See also United States v. Roberson, 6 F.3d 1088, 1089 (5th Cir. 1993) (driving three
miles per hour over the speed limit).
167 It should be noted that finding a traffic violation on which to justify a stop is
relatively easy. As David Harris has observed, "no driver can avoid violating some traffic
law during a short drive, even with the most careful attention." David A. Harris, "Driving
While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic
Stops, 87J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 545 (1997).
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that the officer has full discretion to conduct a pat-down, so long as the
officer, ex post, 168 can articulate a basis to believe an occupant (driver
or passenger) of the car might be armed or dangerous. This could
amount to as little as the fact that you are traveling at night, or driving
through an area where, known to you or not, a violent crime recently
occurred. 169 Alternatively, if the traffic offense is an arrestable offense
- again, in some jurisdictions this may be as little as a failing to wear a
seatbelt 170 - Atwater v. City of Lago Vista makes clear that the officer
can make an arrest,171 which in turn automatically permits the officer
to conduct a search of an individual's person incident to arrest. 72 For
many women, the idea of being personally searched following traffic
stops may conjure images from the Oscar-winning film Crash, 73 in
which a male officer (played by Matt Dillon) conducts a pat down
search of a female passenger that is clearly, and disturbingly, sexual. 174
But again, the gender of the person conducting a bodily search may say
very little about whether a search will or will not be sexual. Crash, after
168 Although the officer is supposed to have reasonable, articulable suspicion ex ante,
the requirement is an empty one since the officer will not be required to formally explain
the basis of his stop until after the stop is over, and often not in full until a suppression
hearing. Unfortunately, this ex post process enables, rather than frustrates, after the fact
rationalizations and, even more unfortunately, lies by the police. See I. Bennett Capers,
Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 858 (2008).
169 See, e.g., United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838 (5th Cir. 1994) (upholding
frisk of man holding an open can of beer in light of the fact that it was night and a high
crime area).
170 In fact, this was the basis for the arrest in Atwater, in which the Court ruled that
the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment when he made a custodial arrest. See
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326-36 (2001). For criticism of Atwater, see
Richard S. Frase, What Were They Thinking? Fourth Amendment Unreasonableness in
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 329, 331 (2002); Arnold H. Loewy,
Cops, Cars, and Citizens: Fixing the Broken Balance, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 535, 559-63
(2002).
171 See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354.
172 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 226 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). In addition, the Supreme Court has ruled that subjecting the
arrestee to a strip search, including a visual inspection of body cavities, before admitting
the suspect to jail is not "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. See Florence v.
Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1523 (2012); Robinson, 414 U.S. at 226.
173 CRASH (Lions Gate Films 2004). The film won the 2005 Oscar for Best Picture.
For the scene in question, see Crash (3/9) Movie CLIP - Pat Down by the Police (2004)
HD, YoUTUBE (Mar. 15, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EtvbEtPlGiA.
174 CRASH, supra note 173. Others may think of the far more disturbing, independent film
Compliance, in which a fast-food restaurant employee is strip-searched at the direction of
someone posing as a law enforcement officer. See COMPLIANCE (Magnolia Pictures 2012).
For the scene in question, see Dreama Walker Strip Search in Compliance, YoUTUBE (Oct. 20,
2013), https//www.youtube.com/watch?v=wLZLODeq3c4.
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all, is a film, and a fictional one at that. For reality, consider an
encounter between a Texas state trooper and two female occupants of a
car. The encounter was captured on tape, thanks to the police car's
video camera. 175 On the tape, the trooper pats down and then gropes
the two women in a manner that is clearly, and disturbingly, sexual.
The trooper, Kelly Helleson, is female.1 76
Of course, one response to this counter-stereotypical evidence is that,
notwithstanding empirical evidence that contradicts the reliability of
sex stereotyping, perception matters. 177 Put differently, if nothing else,
requiring that bodily searches be same-gender searches at least provides
the perception that the search will be non-violative. The thinking here
is that same-gender searches provide peace of mind that cross-gender
searches cannot. However, to raise this argument is to reveal its flaw.
After all, such thinking is likely to lull potential victims into a false sense
of security, much in the same way that the typical rape script - "a male
stranger who jumps out of the bushes, preferably black and wielding a
knife"178 - lulls potential victims into not recognizing that they are far
more likely to be sexually assaulted by someone of the same race, and
indeed someone they know such as a co-worker, a neighbor, or
friend. 179 Again, consider the tape of an actual police officer conducting
175 See Kelly Helleson, Texas Trooper Suspected of "Humiliating" Body Cavity Search, Faces
Firing (Video), HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 30, 2013, 11:22 AM), http//www.huffingtonpost.
com/2013/01/30/kelly-helleson-texas-trooper-body-cavity-fired n 2581779.html?utnhp_
ref=crime.
176 Id. This is not to suggest that male officers do not conduct inappropriate bodily
searches of women. Indeed, a male officer in Florida was recently captured on video
requiring a woman to lift her shirt and shake her breasts following a car stop, claiming
that he suspected she may be concealing drugs. See Video: Woman's "Bra Shake" at Traffic
Stop Criticized, POLICEONE (June 26, 2013), http://www.policeone.com/investigationsl
articles/6294368-Video-Womans-bra-shake-at-traffic-stop-criticized. Rather, the point is
that the gender of the police officer is not determinative as to whether a bodily search will
be sexually inappropriate.
177 There is the related argument that power imbalances matter (i.e., that a woman
in particular might feel vulnerable not because she is the "weaker sex," but because the
officer represents authority). But here too, to articulate the argument is to reveal its
flaw. This power imbalance exists whether the person being searched is male or female.
In other words, it is the uniform and the concomitant apparent authority of the state
that create the power imbalance, not gender.
178 Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, supra note 14, at 829.
179 MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL OF THE
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NAT'L INTIMATE PARTNER & SEXUAL VIOLENCE
SURVEY 22 tbl.2.5 (2010), available at http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/
nisvsreport20l0-a.pdf; LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ- 163392, SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DATA ON
RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 4 (1997), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
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a pat down, versus the tape of a fictional officer in Crash. Any bodily
search, regardless of the gender of the searcher, carries a risk of being a
sexy search.
To be clear, I am not suggesting that the risk of being sexually
assaulted is distributed equally among men and women. Nor am I
suggesting that women are as likely to be perpetrators of sexual assault
as are men. What I am suggesting, however, is that the trope of male
perpetrator/female victim - or as Janet Halley might put it, "M > F"'80
- is essentialist and under-inclusive insofar as it obscures other
combinations of victimization, such as men being victimized by other
men or women, or women being victimized by other women. More
problematic, to focus exclusively on gender tropes obscures the power
imbalance that lies at the heart of sexual assault, a power imbalance that
may overlap with gender, but is not coterminous with it. If the real
source of sexual threat stems from power imbalances, we do ourselves
a disservice when we substitute gender-based proxies for actual power.
We do ourselves a disservice, and we do a disservice to the goal of
gender equality.
C. Individual Preferences
Basing Fourth Amendment reasonableness determinations regarding
bodily searches on the gender of the participants is deeply problematic
for another reason: it caters to individual sex-based preferences. Again,
for many, it may seem perfectly natural that a woman might personally
prefer that another woman conduct any search of her person. Similarly,
many of us would assume that, notwithstanding the popularity of
websites like Chatroulette or politicians like Anthony Weiner, most
men do not relish the thought of exposing their bodies to female
strangers. These aversions, after all, are of a piece with the fact that,
outside of the home at least, men and women are often segregated to
accommodate privacy concerns. At school, at work, at the gym, at
Starbucks, we use gender-segregated restrooms for the most part. For
many, these gender-segregated spaces are also homosocial spaces,
providing a sanctuary where one can be among like individuals. 181
pdf/soo.pdf; see also CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, NCJ-126826, FEMALE VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIME 10 (1991) (seven out of
every ten white rape victims were raped by white offenders).
180 HALLEY, supra note 126, at 17-20.
181 The homosocial function of restrooms cannot be overstated, and I thank
Adrienne Davis for urging me to consider this issue. As Molotch notes:
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While these individual preferences may seem relatively harmless,
they should still trouble us, especially to the extent these individual sex-
based preferences are incorporated in and affected through government
policy and regulations. For starters, endorsing such preferences is
inconsistent with the notion of true gender equality. Indeed, it is out of
this concern for gender equality that we prohibit businesses from hiring
on the basis of gender as a way to cater to the gender preferences of its
customers. For example, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 82 bans
There are women who use the women's room as a respite from male
supervision, a place where "the girls" can let their hair down and exercise
solidarity. Some women report that the ladies' room is where they learned as
girls how to do their hair, hold their bodies, use menstrual products, and
adjust their clothes -with pals and relatives fussing around them in real time.
Harvey Molotch, Introduction: Learning from the Loo, in TOILET: PUBLIC RESTROOMS AND
THE POLITICS OF SHARING 1, 7 (Harvey Molotch & Laura Nor n eds., 2010) [hereinafter
Learning from the Lool. Mary Anne Case makes a similar point:
[Women] see it as a place to escape from a browbeating boss or importunate
suitor, a place where they can cry without being seen and gossip with one
another without being overheard by any man, a place where they can literally
and figuratively let their hair down.
Mary Anne Case, Why Not Abolish Laws of Urinary Segregation?, in TOILET: PUBLIC
RESTROOMS AND THE POLITICS OF SHARING, supra, 211, 221 [hereinafter Why Not Abolish].
While I do not dispute this homosocial function, I cannot help but note that this
function has incredible costs. In Molotch's description, and to a lesser extent in Case's,
gendered restrooms help girls learn how to be girls and women and serve as a place of
retreat. But neither of these benefits does much for advancing gender equality; quite to
the contrary since they reify gender ("how to do their hair"). Molotch, Learning from
the Loo, supra, at 7. It also fails to take into consideration the costs associated with men's
room. To what extent does having men's rooms enable "locker room" conversation to
thrive? Isn't it in men's locker rooms (usually attached to men's rooms) that men once
(and maybe still do) hang pinups of scantily clad women, objectify women, and
exchange ribald jokes about women? While restrooms have homosocial functions, it
also pays to remember that restrooms (the jokes told inside them and images tossed
about) also figure heavily in sex discrimination claims brought by women. See, e.g.,
Hurley v. At. City Police Dep't, 174 F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing a sexual
discrimination claim involving sexually explicit graffiti drawings in the bathroom).
182 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2013). The statute provides, in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
20151
University of California, Davis
sex discrimination in employment unless the employer can demonstrate
that sex is a "bona fide occupational qualification [("BFOQ")]
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business
or enterprise."'183 As courts have made clear, the BFOQ is "meant to be
an extremely narrow exception."' 8 4
Consider Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 8 5 involving Pan Am's
refusal in the early 1970s to hire men as airline attendants solely on the
basis of their sex. When sued for violating Title Vii's non-discrimination
policy, Pan Am argued that the performance of female attendants "was
better in the sense that they were superior in such non-mechanical
aspects of the job as 'providing reassurance to anxious passengers,
giving courteous personalized service and, in general, making flights as
pleasurable as possible within the limitations imposed by aircraft
operations."'' 186 To further buttress its BFOQ defense, Pan Am offered
expert testimony that the "psychological needs" of air passengers "are
better attended to by females."187 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that none of these findings could justify discrimination in
violation of Title VII. As the court put it:
While we recognize that the public's expectation of finding one
sex in a particular role may cause some initial difficulty, it
would be totally anomalous if we were to allow the preferences
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
183 Id. § 2000e-2(e)(1); see also Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful
Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
149, 205 (1992) (positing that hiring only women as strippers would be permissible as
a BFOQ); Yuracko, supra note 89, at 157 (observing that "it seems likely that courts
would permit such sex-based hiring as a BFOQ"). For example, to permit only women
to audition for the role of Lady Macbeth would qualify as a BFOQ. As would only
interviewing women to work in a strip club. Cf. Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp.
292, 301 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (observing in dicta that a BFOQ would exist in "jobs where
sex or vicarious sexual recreation is the primary service provided, e.g.I,1 a social escort
or topless dancer . . . [since] the employee's sex and the service provided are
inseparable").
184 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977) ("[T] he bfoq exception was in
fact meant to be an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of sex."); see also Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace &
Agr. Implement Workers of Am., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201
(1991) (noting BFOQ is a narrow exception).
185 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
186 Id. at 387 (quoting Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 559, 563
(S.D. Fla. 1970)).
187 Id. at 387.
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and prejudices of the customers to determine whether the sex
discrimination was valid. Indeed, it was, to a large extent, these
very prejudices the Act was meant to overcome."'' l
Wilson v. Southwest Airlines'89 also involved the issue of customer
preferences. Hoping to distinguish itself from other airlines, and noting
that its commuter market consisted primarily of male businessmen,
Southwest Airlines launched a campaign to market itself as the "love
airline," 190 and hired only women in ticket agent and flight attendant
positions. 191 In short, the airline sold opposite-sex appeal. 92
Notwithstanding its success and its claim, supported by customer
preference surveys, that having only women ticket agents and
attendants increased business, the court concluded that Southwest's
hiring practice violated Title VII. 193
Recognition of a sex BFOQ for Southwest's public contact
personnel based on the airline's "love" campaign opens the door
for other employers freely to discriminate by tacking on sex or
sex appeal as a qualification for any public contact position
where customers preferred employees of a particular sex. In
order not to undermine Congress' purpose to prevent
employers from "refusing to hire an individual based on
stereotyped characterizations of the sexes,". . . a BFOQ for sex
must be denied where sex is merely useful for attracting
customers of the opposite sex, but where hiring both sexes will
not alter or undermine the essential function of the employer's
business.194
While lower courts have not been entirely consistent in adhering to
Title VII's "uncompromising"'195 language - for example, allowing
188 Id. at 389.
189 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
190 Id. at 294-95.
191 Id.
192 Southwest's television commercials featured attractive flight attendants in fitted
outfits and promised "in-flight love." A passenger at the airline could use a "quickie
machine" to secure a ticket and thus receive "instant gratification." On board, the
attendants wore hot-pants and served "love bites (toasted almonds)" and "love potions
(cocktails)." See id. at 294 n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
193 Id. at 304.
194 Id. Similarly, there is no BFOQ in hiring only male waiters to create an ambience
of Old World traditions. See EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1294 (11 th
Cir. 2000). Nor is there is a BFOQ in only hiring male waiters in a "high-class"
restaurant. See Levendos v. Stern Entm't, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 1104, 1107 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
195 Kapczynski, supra note 119, at 1257.
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hospitals to decline to hire male nurses for labor and delivery rooms 196
- and while the Supreme Court has intimated that a preference for
same-sex privacy, as opposed to rank customer preference, 97 could be
the basis for a BFOQ, 198 the take away remains the same: we should be
troubled by concessions to such preferences.199 As Amy Kapczynski
observed over a decade ago, the "problem is the same one that attends
all concessions to customer preference: They exactly reproduce the
prejudices that generate gendered stratification and hierarchy in the
196 See Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1354 (D. Del. 1978).
For a discussion of the tension between Title VIl's rejection of customer preference and
deference to customer privacy concerns, see Miriam A. Cherry, Exercising the Right to
Public Accommodations: The Debate over Single-Sex Health Clubs, 52 ME. L. REV. 97
(2000) (discussing privacy and the BFOQ defense in the context of single-sex health
clubs); Michael R. Evans, The Case for All-Female Health Clubs: Creating a Compensatory
Purpose Exception to State Public Accommodation Laws, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 307
(1999) (proposing a new standard for states to use in amending public accommodation
laws to allow sex classifications); and Kapczynski, supra note 119, at 1257. See also
Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410, 1416 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Brooks v.
ACF Indus., Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1122, 1131 (S.D. W. Va. 1982); Backus v. Baptist Med.
Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1194 (E.D. Ark. 1981); Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances:
The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 25-27 (2000);
Yuracko, supra note 89, at 204; Rachel L. Cantor, Comment, Consumer Preferences for
Sex and Title VII: Employing Market Definition Analysis for Evaluating BFOQ Defenses,
1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 493, 502-03 (1999); Katie Manley, Note, The BFOQ Defense: Title
VII's Concession to Gender Discrimination, 16 DUKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y 169, 188-90
(2009). The issue has also been discussed in the context of public accommodation laws.
197 Of course, as several scholars have observed, privacy concerns are simply
customer preference stated another way. Cantor, supra note 196, at 505-09; Yuracko,
supra note 89, at 163-66. Even the privacy argument is wanting, especially when courts
intimate a constitutional right to privacy that is gender-based. As Amy Kapczynski
observes:
Once one begins to ask why it is less private to be seen in a state of undress
by one sex rather than the other, the foundational logic of the same-sex
privacy cases rapidly breaks down .... IFor example], how can it be more or
less private - as opposed to comfortable, intuitive, pleasing, or embarrassing
- to be seen in a state of undress by a male nurse rather than by a male
doctor?
Kapczynski, supra note 119, at 1269-70.
198 Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agr. Implement Workers of Am., UAW
v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206 n.4 (1991).
199 Of course, some scholars may disagree. For example, Lex Larson, in his treatise
on employment discrimination, opines that "giving respect to deep-seated feelings of
personal privacy involving one's own genital areas is quite a different matter from
catering to the desire of some male airline passengers [to have a little diluted sexual
titillation from] the hovering presence of an attractive female flight attendant." 3 LEx K.
LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 43.0213] [b] (2d ed. 2002).
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work force in the first place." 200 For those of us who consider ourselves
feminists, the rub is even greater: there is something Janus-faced about
being opposed to sex discrimination in the context of hiring airline
stewardesses, while embracing similar sex-based preferences in the
context of airline travelers and TSA employees.
And here is the thing. The problem is graver in cases involving police
interaction with citizens, TSA interaction with travelers, prison officials'
interaction with inmates, and public school officials' interaction with
students. This is because when the government accedes to customer
preferences, much more is at stake. Not only does the government
accession to customer preferences "reproduce the prejudices that
generate gendered stratification and hierarchy,"201 to again borrow
Kapczynski's language, it also sends the expressive message that such
preferences are both acceptable and right.202 Far from disrupting
gendered stratification, government action entrenches it.203
Allow me to go a step further. We should be as troubled by
government accommodation and enforcement of individual sex-based
preferences as we would be of government accommodation and
enforcement of individual race-based preferences, a matter I will return
to in some detail in Part IV. But first, it is useful to lay the groundwork
for this discussion by turning to the paradigmatic site of gender
200 Kapczynski, supra note 119, at 1264. For example, Kapczynski notes that the
"same hospitals that refused to allow male nurses to provide intimate care for female
patients regularly allowed male doctors to provide such care for female patients," thus
replicating a gendered hierarchy in hospitals. Id. at 1264-65. Deborah Calloway makes
a similar point, noting that allowing concerns about privacy to trump Title VIi's goal of
gender equity "expressly maintains the status quo. Intimate contact [is acceptable
when] females fill their traditional role as nurses and males fill their traditional role as
doctors, police officers, and prison guards. Privacy interests are asserted and prevail
when men or women attempt to break into the traditionally segregated professions."
Deborah A. Calloway, Equal Employment and Third Party Privacy Interests: An Analytical
Framework for Reconciling Competing Rights, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 327, 329-30 (1985).
201 Kapczynski, supra note 119, at 1264.
202 On the importance of attending to law's expressive message, see Elizabeth S.
Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1571 (2000); Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113
HARV. L. REV. 413, 419-25 (1999); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning,
62 U. CHi. L. REV. 943, 944-49 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of
Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2021-25 (1996).
203 It also communicates a norm of modesty: that decent women should be ashamed
to display parts of their bodies to men and that real men should balk at the idea of being
groped by women. In this sense, it communicates what it means to be male or female, a
component part of which includes having a certain desire for privacy. As such, it is a
norm that instantiates something akin to what Anita Allen has described as "coercing
privacy." Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 728-29 (1999).
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segregation, segregated restrooms, and what Lacan famously called
"urinary segregation. '" 204
111. A RESTROOM BREAK
Women need to start measuring their degree of equality by
public toilets.
- Taunya Lovell Banks20 5
It may seem odd that an article on unmooring the Fourth Amendment
from traditional notions of sex and gender would pause to take a
restroom break. 206 But in fact, societal discomfort with cross-gender
searches is likely traceable, and shares much in common with, ingrained
notions of sexual difference and sexual propriety. This Part accordingly
examines restrooms as the paradigmatic site of sexual difference and
sexual modesty, and as the quintessential "separate sphere." 207 The
point here is two-fold. One, restrooms too are sites that produce and
reproduce gender difference. Two, understanding gender segregation in
restrooms can help us better understand, and interrogate, the role of
tradition in determining the reasonableness of Fourth Amendment
searches.
For many, to talk about restrooms, or rather what happens in
restrooms, is alone a cause for embarrassment. Indeed, when the subject
of restrooms comes up, we tend to engage in circumlocutions and
evasions. Clara Greed, a professor of urban planning, reminds us:
The very terms commonly in play - restrooms, comfort stations,
public conveniences (to name a few of them) - are redolent with
cultural embarrassment. Americans say they are "going to the
bathroom" when they are heading to a room wherein, curiously,
there is no bathtub. Similarly, Brits say they are about to "go to
the loo" - from the French term for water, l'eau. Other
euphemisms are also associated with water and washing, such
204 Lacan, supra note 16, at 151.
205 Taunya Lovell Banks, Toilets as a Feminist Issue: A True Story, 6 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 263, 267 (1991).
206 Indeed, as Professor Taunya Lovell Banks discovered, merely writing about
restrooms and restroom inequality can subject one to accusations of focusing on trivial
things. See id. at 269-71.
207 By "separate sphere," I am of course referring to the notion, widely accepted in
the nineteenth century, that men properly occupy the sphere of public life, while
women's proper sphere is that of the home and domesticity. For more on this notion,
see Linda K. Kerber, Separate Spheres, Female Worlds, Woman's Place: The Rhetoric of
Women's History, 75J. AM. HIST. 9, 11 (1988).
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as lavatory, or when people say they will "go wash up" or "wash
my hands," activities that occur after the event that is the actual
purpose of the trip. 208
We are loath to discuss restrooms as places where the body, quite
literally, reasserts its primacy. 209 Sociologist Harvey Molotch observes
as much in his book Toilet:
The toilet is a foundational start point where each of us deals
directly with our bodies and confronts whatever it provides,
often on a schedule not of our own making. The animal in us
comes to the fore, and we must accommodate to its tendencies
and demands. It is "bare life," as it surfaces in social existence. 210
Indeed, it is perhaps because excretion is "bare life" that, as a society,
we have historically gone to great lengths to both conceal what we do,
and to make sure that we only do it around certain types of people. In
other words, restrooms are one way we have enforced "who will be with
whom, where and when."2 11 Restrooms have been regulated along lines
of religion, 212 along lines of race, 213 and to a certain extent continue to
208 Clara Greed, Creating a Nonsexist Restroom, in TOILET: PUBLIC RESTROOMS AND THE
POLITICS OF SHARING, supra note 181, at 117, 119. One could add to the list of evasions
the expression, "I'm going to powder my nose." Even the architect Alexander Kira, in
his groundbreaking monograph, The Bathroom, felt the need to invent new terminology
around bathroom activities. Toilets become "hygiene facilities," urinating and
defecating become "elimination." ALEXANDER KIRA, THE BATHROOM: CRITERIA FOR DESIGN
3, 93 (2d ed. 1976).
209 This was especially true during the late-Victorian period, when human bodily
functions were intertwined with notions of morality. See Terry S. Kogan, Sex Separation:
The Cure-All for Victorian Social Anxiety, in TOILET: PUBLIC RESTROOMS AND THE POLITICS
OF SHARING, supra note 181, at 145, 145; see also JOHN F. KASSON, RUDENESS & CIVILITY:
MANNERS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY URBAN AMERICA 124 (1990) (noting that in "public
especially, but also in private, one sought particularly to stifle all activities that might
draw attention to the internal workings of the body, such as coughing, sneezing,
yawning, scratching, tooth picking, throat clearing, and nose blowing. More intimate
functions were generally beneath discussion").
210 Molotch, Learning from the Loo, supra note 181, at 2.
211 Id. at8.
212 See Zena Kamash, Which Way to Look? Exploring Latrine Use in the Roman World,
in TOILET: PUBLIC RESTROOMS AND THE POLITICS OF SHARING, supra 181, at 47, 60-62; see
also MARTIN SCHOENHALS, INTIMATE EXCLUSION: RACE AND CASTE TURNED INSIDE OUT 203-
05 (2003) (discussing the effects of a caste system on daily activities such as going to
the bathroom).
213 C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OFJIM CROW 98 (3d rev. ed. 1974). On
the history and extent of the laws regarding segregation in public accommodations, see
generally id. at 1-65.
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be regulated along lines of class and position,214 notwithstanding the
fact that what we do in restrooms - excrete and urinate, to speak
without circumlocution - are precisely the activities where class and
race are irrelevant. In this sense, restrooms are part of the "technologies
of division and separation,"2 15 that divide "the population into high and
low, and control of the lower orders." 216 The most pervasive regulation,
however, has been that of gender.
Most restrooms, after all, by words or signs, divide people into two
unchanging genders, a form of segregation that "is at once immensely
naturalized and immensely policed, the most taken-for-granted social
categorization and the most fiercely regulated."21 7 Indeed, one of the first
things children learn outside of the home is the social code of restrooms.
More than whether they must wear the color blue of pink, or wear their
hair long or short, we impress upon them that at bottom, literally and
figuratively, gender matters, and that there is one restroom for "Ladies"
and another restroom for "Gents."218 This, too, is toilet training.
Indeed, as early as 1887, there was a law mandating separate
restrooms. A Massachusetts statute, entitled "An Act to Secure Proper
Sanitary Provisions in Factories and Workshops," required that "water-
closets" be provided for female employees and that the water closets be
separate and apart from those used by males.219 By 1920, similar
legislation existed in the overwhelming majority of states.220 Much of
214 For example, airlines tend to segregate restrooms by coach and business; many
universities continue to have separate restrooms for faculty members and students; and
many businesses continue to have executive restrooms. Indeed, a Seinfeld episode, "The
Revenge," begins with George Costanza quitting after being banned from the executive
washroom. Seinfeld: The Revenge (NBC television broadcast Apr. 18, 1991).
215 Ruth Barcan, Dirty Spaces: Separation, Concealment, and Shame in the Public Toilet,
in TOILET: PUBLICRESTROOMS AND THE POLITICS OF SHARING, supra note 181, at 25, 29; see
also SHEILA L. CAVANAGH, QUEERING BATHROOMS: GENDER, SEXUALITY, AND THE HYGIENIC
IMAGINATION 28 (2010) (describing the modern lavatory as "part and parcel of the bio-
political regulation of the body, its gender, and its sexuality").
216 Barcan, supra note 215, at 29 (quoting Alan Hyde, Offensive Bodies, in THE SMELL
CULTURE READER 53, 53 (Jim Drobnick ed., 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
217 ld.; see also Joel Sanders, Introduction, in STUD: ARCHITECTURES OF MASCULINITY
10, 17 (Joel Sanders ed., 1996) (observing that the architecture of the public bathroom
"naturalizes gender by separating 'men' and 'women"').
218 Of course, "Ladies" and "Gents" are just one of several options. Mary Anne Case
adds a few more: "Stallions" and "Fillies"; "Pointers" and "Setters." Case, Why Not
Abolish, supra note 181, at 211.
219 Act of Mar. 24, 1887, ch. 103, § 2, 1887 Mass. Acts 668-69.
220 George Martin Kober, History of Industrial Hygiene and Its Effects on Public Health,
in A HALF CENTURY OF PUBLIC HEALTH 361, 376-77 (Mazyck P. Ravenel ed., 1921).
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this legislation was transparently paternalistic and moralistic. 221 For
example, North Dakota's law mandating sex-segregated restrooms was
entitled, "An Act to Protect the Lives and Health and Morals of Women
and Minor Workers." 222
My point here is not to provide a history of sex-segregated restrooms
in this country, but rather to show that such segregation originated with
so-called scientific assumptions that "women were inherently different
from men in their anatomy, physiology, temperament, and intellect." 223
Terry Kogan makes a similar observation in his exploration of the legal
history of segregated restrooms: The historical and social justifications
for segregated restrooms were not based on gender-neutrality; rather,
they were "adopted as way to vindicate early-nineteenth-century moral
ideology concerning the appropriate role and place for women in
society."2 24 In doing so, they exaggerated gender difference.2 25 The need
to protect women's modesty was considered so important that an
inspection of factory facilities could be deemed inadequate if stall doors
did not reach the floor and "the feet and lower parts of the skirts of
females occupying the water-closets [could] be seen from the
workrooms." 226 As Kogan notes, it was a violation of Victorian modesty
"for any part of a woman's anatomy to be subjected to public scrutiny
while she perform[ed] intimate bodily functions .... Victorian modesty
was threatened if a woman could even be seen entering the facility." 2 7
All of this is connected to how we have been disciplined, in the
Foucauldian sense,2 28 to view gender difference and modesty. The
existence of one room for "Ladies" and another for "Gents" does not
just tell us where to go to excrete and urinate. It tells us that there is a
difference between men and women, and that this difference matters,
221 See Kogan, supra note 209, at 156.
222 Act of Mar. 6, 1919, ch. 174, 1919 N.D. Laws 317-22.
223 CYNTHIA EAGLE RuSSETT, SEXUAL SCIENCE: THE VICTORIAN CONSTRUCTION OF
WOMANHOOD 11 (1989).
224 Kogan, supra note 209, at 163.
225 CAVANAGH, supra note 215, at 28.
226 Kogan, supra note 209, at 159 (citing CHAS P. NEILL, REPORT ON CONDITION OF
WOMAN AND CHILD WAGE-EARNERS IN THE UNITED STATES: VOLUME 1: COTTON TEXTILE
INDUSTRY, S. REP. No. 61-645, at 371 (1910), available at http://sul-derivatives.stanford.
edu/derivative?CSN ID=00003814&mediaType=application/pdf).
227 Kogan, supra note 209, at 159.
228 According to Foucault, through a host of policies and regulations, the state
ensures the internalization of self-discipline and the creation of "obedient subjects." See
MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 128-29 (Alan
Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY: VOLUME 1: AN INTRODUCTION 85 (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1990)
(1976).
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"with each swing [of the door] reinforcing the binary." 229 It also tells us
how gender should be performed. 230 For example, that it is manly to
stand to urinate. 231 And it is normative, telling us that gender should
matter. 232 Much like the Biblical story of Adam and Eve, or for that
matter the story of Susanna and the Elders, 233 segregated restrooms
229 Harvey Molotch, On Not Making History: What NYU Did with the Toilet and What
It Means for the World, in TOILET: PUBLIC RESTROOMS AND THE POLITICS OF SHARING, supra
note 181, at 255, 256 [hereinafter On Not Making History]. Erving Goffman makes a
similar point. "[Olne does not so much deal with segregation as with segregative
punctuation of the day's round, [thus] ensuring that subcultural differences can be
reaffirmed and reestablished in the face of contact between the sexes." Erving Goffman,
The Arrangement Between the Sexes, 4 THEORY & SoC'Y 301, 316 (1977).
230 The architect Alex Schweder makes a similar observation. "Contemporary
bathrooms are designed to be stages on which reductive gender roles are played out and
reinforced. By going into separate rooms, we are choosing which role we will play in
the performance of gender. Alex Schweder, Stalls Between Walls: Segregated Sexed
Spaces, in LADIES AND GENTS: PUBLIC TOILETS AND GENDER 182, 183-84 (Olga Gershenson
& Barbara Penner eds., 2009).
231 On gender as performance and as a mode of enacting and reenacting received
gender norms, see JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF
IDENTITY xviii-xxiii (2d ed. 1999). Turning to how gender should be performed, men's
rooms communicate that it is manly for men to urinate standing, not sitting as most
women do. It is telling that when there was a move in Germany to encourage men to sit
when they urinate, many men resisted on the ground that there was something essential
to masculinity to urinate while standing. The scholar Klaus Schwerma was so offended
by the movement that he wrote a book in opposition. The book, STEHPINKELN: DIE
LETZTE BASTION DER MANNLICHKEIT?, loosely translates into "Peeing Standing Up - The
Last Bastion of Masculinity?". KLAUS SCHWERMA, STEHPINKELN: DIE LETZTE BASTION DER
MANNLICHKEIT? (2000) (Ger.). Men's rooms also communicate that it is manly to avoid
eye contact with other men, and to stand apart from other men. For more on men's
rooms and their role in setting forth the normative parameters of masculinity, see Craig
Heimbuch, 7 Rules of Men's Bathroom Etiquette, GOOD MEN PROJECT (Apr. 24, 2012),
http://goodmenproject.comgood-feed-blog/7-rules-of-mens-bathroom-etiquette.
232 Indeed, restrooms segregated along gender lines have the effect of dismissing those
who do not easily fit within the prescribed binary as irrelevant, much in the same way a
judicial or policy requirement of same-gender searches does. As one scholar has remarked,
"Sex segregated restrooms force people to choose 'male' or 'female' - those who refuse to
accept the dichotomy become defined out of existence. People who do not identify with
their socially assigned sexual category represent the remainder of sexual division - the
leftovers, sexuality's refuse." Alex More, Note, Coming Out of the Water Closet: The Case
Against Sex Segregated Bathrooms, 17 TEX.J. WOMEN & L. 297,303 (2008). On the role the
state plays in policing gendered boundaries through the active harassment and exclusion
of gender nonconforming individuals from restrooms, see Jeffrey Kosbie, (No) State
Interests in Regulating Gender: How Suppression of Gender Nonconformity Violates Freedom
of Speech, 19 WM. & MARYJ. WOMEN & L. 187, 246 (2013).
233 See Suk, Is Privacy a Woman?, supra note 133 at 490-91; Cheryl Smith Blum,
Comment, The Place of Art in Catherine MacKinnon's Feminist Legal Theory, 19 J.
CONTEMP. L. 445, 461-69 (1993). See generally Carol Weisbrod, Susanna and the Elders:
A Note on the Regulation of Families, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 271 (discussing what Susanna
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discipline girls and women to consider their bodies "sacred temples"
that must be kept hidden from the male gaze, and to think that a
gendered designation on the restroom door, or in some cases a somatic
sign (e.g., the ubiquitous skirted woman),234 will insulate them from
sexual attack from men. 235 But this is only part of what women's rooms
do. They are one of the places where women learn the rituals of
femininity: how to do their hair, how to measure themselves against
other women, how to put on make-up, indeed how to make themselves
up. Viewed this way, the euphemism "going to the Ladies to powder my
nose" (in lieu of "I'm going to take a leak") becomes, in part, literally
true. In this sense, the Women's Room, with its conveniently placed
mirrors, functions not just as a place for eliminating bodily wastes, but
also a place where females make themselves feminine and inhabit
femininity, which as Beverly Skeggs has argued, is often one of the few
forms of capital available to women in our scopic economy. 236
And men are disciplined too.237 Restrooms, after all, function not only
as heteronormative, homosocial spaces, but also as spaces where men
are homosocialized in ways that are decidedly masculinist and often
sexist.238 It is here, after all, where girls and women are most objectified
and the Elders imparts about the law and family governance). Visual representations of
the story in fact mimic our preoccupation with sex and its tantalizing forbidden-ness.
Paintings condemn the lecherous elders for looking while simultaneously offering the
nude Susanna to the viewer. For more on this dynamic, see JOHN BERGER, WAYS OF
SEEING 45-64 (1972). The story of Susanna and the Elders tells the story of the virginal
Susanna who is bathing nude in the garden when she is espied, and sexually
propositioned, by two elders. The story has not only been the subject of numerous
paintings, it has also served as a frequent subject in feminist legal thought. Suk, Is
Privacy a Woman?, supra note 133, at 490 & n.38.
234 For an interesting discussion of gendered bathroom signs, see Marissa, Go Where?
Sex, Gender, and Toilets, Soc'Y PAGES (Sept. 2, 2010, 10:07 AM), http://thesocietypages.
org/socimages/20 10/09/02/guest-post-go-where-sex-gender-and-toilets/.
235 That gender segregated restrooms are safer is certainly questionable. Having a
greater number of individuals in a restroom, including men, may in fact make restrooms
safer for everyone. Louise M. Antony, Back to Androgeny: What Bathrooms Can Teach Us
About Equality, 9 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 5 (1998) (noting that "sexually segregated
bathrooms are, arguably, more dangerous than unisex facilities would be, since a would-
be assailant has a reasonable expectation that he will find potential victims, and only
potential victims, in a ladies' room"); Molotch, On Not Making History, supra note 229,
at 271.
236 Beverley Skeggs, The Toilet Paper: Femininity, Class and Mis-Recognition, 24
WOMEN'S STUDIES INT'L F. 295, 303-04 (2001).
237 As Lee Edelman succinctly observes, "The design of the men's room, simply put,
has palpable designs on men; it aspires, that is, to design them." Lee Edelman, Men's
Room, in STUD: ARCHITECTURES OF MASCULINITY, supra note 217, at 152, 152.
238 Barcan, supra note 215, at 39. Men's rooms are also places where boys learn to
engage in behavior associated with hegemonic masculinity. As David Cohen observes:
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- via graffiti, via jokes - in the face of their physical absence. And it
does all of this in a way that is by necessity deeply hierarchical, since
differentiating along lines of sex invariably works to maintain a system
in which those differences matter.
As Mary Anne Case reminds us, it is telling that a recurring argument
of opponents of the Equal Rights Amendment was that passage would
mean the end of segregated restrooms. 239 Or consider more recent
language of conservative commentator Rush Limbaugh: "Feminism
supports equality .... Look what has to happen to institutions in order
for these people to secure equality. You have to weaken the institution,
in this case male and female bathrooms." 240 In other words, segregated
restrooms are an institution, the final site of gender inequality.
Of course, the anticipated response to this observation is that having
separate restrooms for men and women is not unequal, at least where
men and women have "potty parity," 241 a phrase used to denote equitable
provision of separate toilet facilities. 242 An equally likely response is that
[WIhen men are in sex-segregated environments, they often engage in
behavior that creates, reinforces, and exacerbates negative attitudes about
women that contribute to men's oppression of women. This occurs in a variety
of ways, such as perceiving women as inferior, as sex objects, or as threats to
male privilege. When these attitudes are created, reinforced, or exacerbated,
men further their dominance over women.
David S. Cohen, Keeping Men "Men" and Women Down: Sex Segregation, Anti-
Essentialism, and Masculinity, 33 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 509, 544 (2010) [hereinafter
Keeping Men "Men"]; see also David S. Cohen, Sex Segregation, Masculinities, and Gender-
Variant Individuals, in MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH 167,
168-69 (Frank Rudy Cooper & Ann C. McGinley eds., 2012) (noting "sex segregation
contributes to an essentialized view of what it means to be a man" and that restrooms
are sex segregated). Given this masculinist socialization, it is perhaps not surprising
that, as architect Alexander Kira observed, urinals for men are often shaped like vaginas.
See KIRA, supra note 208, at 106.
239 Case, Why Not Abolish, supra note 181, at 211; see also Antony, supra note 235, at 2.
240 Case, Why Not Abolish, supra note 181, at 212 (quoting Rush Limbaugh, Feminist
Groups Can't Choose Bathrooms, RUSH LIMBAUGH SHOW (Nov. 26, 2003) at 2:12-2:25,
available at http://mfile.akamai.com/5020/wma/rushlimb.downoad.akamai.com/5020/
clips/03/11/112603_6_feminists.asx).
241 Id. at 212. Of course, determining what is equal is problematic since many believe that
equality in number is not the ideal metric. For example, in January 2009, a public interest
lawyer at George Washington University Law School threatened to sue President Obama's
Presidential Inaugural Committee, arguing that its plan to provide an equal number of
portable toilets for men and women expected to attend the inauguration would in effect be
unequal, since women take longer to use restrooms. See Emily Cahn, Law Professor Threatens
Lawsuit over Inauguration Toilets, GW HATCHET (Jan. 15, 2009), http://www.gwhatchet.
com/2009/01/15/law-professor-threatens-lawsuit-over-inauguration-toilets/.
242 Case, Why Not Abolish, supra note 181, at 212.
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this is how things have always been. Neither response is satisfying. As
Erving Goffman observed in his discussion of the practice, just a
generation ago, of placing boys and girls in separate lines after recess:
As in the case of the parallel organization which occurs with
respect to other binary social divisions - white/black, adult/child,
officer/enlisted man, etc. - parallel organization based on sex
provides a ready base for the elaboration of differential treatment,
these adumbrative elaborations to be seen as consonant and
suitable given the claimed difference in character between the two
categories. Thus, to revert to the simple example, once children are
made to form sex-segregated files, it is a simple matter to rule that
the female file enters before the male file, presumably because the
"gentler" sex should be given preference in the matter of getting
out of the raw outdoors first, and both sexes should be given little
lessons on proper regard for gender.243
This is only one of several counter-arguments. If restrooms are where
business - and here I mean real business - gets conducted, with men
discussing work and making gentlemen's agreements, then segregated
restrooms have the effect of perpetuating hierarchies of power and
access along gendered lines, much in the same way that all-male eating
clubs and country clubs did.244 But more than this, as a matter of
government policy and law, can gender really be irrelevant when we
insist, with each swing of the door, on its salience? It is easy to imagine
restrooms that are gender neutral, with private stalls and a common area
for hand-washing and hand-wringing, mirror gazing and mirror
avoidance, and doing real business.245 Indeed, there is a growing trend
for gender-neutral restrooms on college and university campuses. 246 If
243 Goffman, supra note 229, at 306.
244 Cohen, Keeping Men "Men," supra note 238, at 543; Kelly Levy, Note, Equal, But
Still Separate?: The Constitutional Debate of Sex-Segregated Public Restrooms in the
Twenty-First Century, 32 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 248, 264-65 (2011); see also Michael M.
Burns, The Exclusion of Women from Influential Men's Clubs: The Inner Sanctum and the
Myth of Full Equality, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 321, 325-34 (1983).
245 Such a gender-neutral restroom was often a focal point of the popular late 1990s
TV show Ally McBeal, set in a law firm. For a compilation of clips, see Foxabulous, Ally
McBeal and the Unisex Bathroom, YouTuBE (Oct. 12, 2009), http://www.youtube.
cor/watch?v=AYUavFaQwEw. One may think as well of the liberatory aspect on the
1990s television show My So Called Life, in which the openly gay character Rickie
Vasquez was always welcome in the girls' room. For a discussion of this aspect of the
show, see Caitlin, Policing Gender: Gender-Segregated Restrooms, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY
BLOG (Nov. 9, 2011, 1:56 PM), http://femlegaltheory.blogspot.com/2011/11/policing-
gender-gender-segregated.html.
246 See Christine Lagorio, If You Go.... N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2010, at ED4.
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the message conveyed by this vision of gender-neutral restrooms is
equality-enhancing, then what message is communicated by restrooms
that insist on gender difference? Is it not more likely, as Mary Anne Case
has speculated, that "somewhat perversely," the opponents to the equal
rights for women were right about this one thing: that "the achievement
of equal rights for women may entail an end to sex segregation in the
public toilet"?247 And if that is true, then Ian Ayres is right when he
asserts that it is time to cross the gender line in restrooms. 248 As Ayres
puts it: "It actually furthers civil rights. It's refusing to accept separate
but equal - particularly when it serves no purpose." 249
One final note before I turn to a related observation. One of the most
popular "feminist" books during the heady 1970s, when the women's
movement thought true equality might be obtainable, was Marilyn
French's The Women's Room. 250 The book cover made the title even more
interesting, since it depicted a sign reading "The Ladies Room," but with
the word "Ladies" scratched out and replaced, in lipstick no less, with
the word "Women's": "The Women's Room." 25 ' But scratching out
Ladies and replacing it with Women is still substituting one gendered
description for another. It is still doing gender.252
All of this brings me back to gender and the Fourth Amendment.
Although I have used this Part to focus on gender-segregated restrooms,
it is because gender-segregated restrooms seem to inform, and indeed
give license to, government policy and judicial preferences for gender-
sameness in Fourth Amendment searches. Or to put it more bluntly,
one seems to follow the other. Gender-segregated restrooms, and
gender-segregated Fourth Amendment searches, are after all predicated
on many of the same arguments, and lead to the same results. We are
marking gender as a distinction with significance. We are saying that
gender matters beyond biological differences, and that it should matter.
247 Case, Why Not Abolish, supra note 181, at 225.
248 lan Ayres, Looking Out for No. 2: A Modest Proposal for Single-Use Toilets, SLATE (Mar.
7, 2005, 5:01 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news-andpolitics/jurisprudence/2005/03/
looking-out for no 2.html.
249 Id.
250 See generally MARILYN FRENCH, THE WOMEN'S ROOM (1977) (a novel following the
feminist awakening of a young woman living in the 1950s).
251 Id.
252 Although he touches only briefly on restrooms, David Cruz makes a similar
argument about the role the government plays in underwriting and perpetuating gender
difference. Ultimately, he argues for the government to disestablish itself from sex and
gender distinctions, much in the way that the government disestablishes itself, at least
nominally, from religion. In short, the government should have a "respectful
indifference to sex difference." See Cruz, supra note 142, at 1009.
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In short, we are imbuing biological difference with meaning. 253 And for
those of us who care about true gender equality, that meaning should
be very troubling.
IV. RACE MATTERS
All of this leads me to ask: Would we condone government policies
that favored same-race bodily searches? Can we imagine Fourth
Amendment reasonableness determinations that considered whether the
person being physically searched and the person conducting the search
were of the same race? 254 While the likely response is a ready "no" -
because such favoring would offend the Equal Protection Clause and
would offend our notions of the type of society in which we want to live2s5
- the reality is far more complex. It is complex because, to a large extent,
we do in fact accede to individual race-based preferences. And it is
complex because our history of racial segregation has always been
intertwined with, and inseparable from, sex segregation.
Notwithstanding official pronouncements that we are a post-racial
society, or at least aspire to be one, we in fact permit individuals to
discriminate along lines of race in their personal lives. Thus, as Elizabeth
Emens reminds us, 256 we are now officially nonpartisan when it comes to
253 It recalls Camille Paglia's risible assertion that "[mlale urination really is a kind
of an accomplishment, an arc of transcend [elnce. A woman merely waters the ground
she stands on." CAMILLE PAGLIA, SEXUAL PERSONAE: ART AND DECADENCE FROM NEFERTITI
TO EMILY DICKINSON 21 (1990). Paglia also claims that if civilization had been left in
women's hands, "we would still be living in grass huts." Id. at 38.
254 What "race" would even mean under such a regime is questionable, especially
since race, as a matter of biology, has little if any inherent meaning. Rather, race is
largely a social construct. See, e.g., MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION
IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990s, at 55 (2d ed. 1994) (describing
racial formation as the "sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created,
inhabited, transformed, and destroyed"); Ian F. Haney-L6pez, The Social Construction
of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1, 7 (1994) ("Race is neither an essence nor an illusion, but rather an ongoing,
contradictory, self-reinforcing process subject to the macro forces of social and political
struggle and the micro effects of daily decisions."); Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The
Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 741, 774 (1994) ("'[R]ace' is neither a
natural fact simply there in 'reality,' nor a wrong idea, eradicable by an act of will.").
But even this social construct can present difficulties. Would the golfer Tiger Woods,
the singer Mariah Carey, or the reporter Soledad O'Brian, each of whom is mixed raced,
be searched by someone black, or white, or another mixed raced individual, and would
the particular admixture matter?
255 Such a regime would also be problematic insofar as it reifies race, a problem I
discuss elsewhere. See Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, supra note 22, at 22-23.
256 Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State's Role in the Accidents of Sex
and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1308 (2009); see also Russell K. Robinson, Structural
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individual racial preferences in whom to date or marry or engage in
sexual intimacies with.257 Even in less intimate areas, we tend to tolerate
some racial preferences and racial discrimination. For example, although
we prohibit racial discrimination in employment and housing, we
expressly exclude from that prohibition employers with fewer than fifteen
employees,258 and individual homeowners and landlords.259
While these examples are familiar to many, there is another, less
familiar example which has particular relevance to the issue of same-
race/same-gender bodily searches, since it too involves physical contact:
which health care professionals we allow to treat us.
Consider a recent incident from 2013. Tonya Battle, a neonatal nurse
with twenty-five years' experience, filed a lawsuit against the Michigan
hospital where she worked after discovering a note on an assignment
clipboard that read, "No African-American nurse to take care of
baby."260 In fact, a hospital supervisor who was acceding to the request
of the white father, who preferred that no blacks handle his newborn,
wrote the note.261 Although the case, which the hospital quickly settled,
generated significant media attention,262 the father's request and the
Dimensions of Romantic Preferences, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2787, 2787-88, 2793 (2008)
(arguing that many racial preferences "rest on nothing more substantial or legitimate
than rank stereotyping"); cf. Katie Eyer, Constitutional Colorblindness and the Family,
162 U. PA. L. REV. 537 (2014) (comparing the Supreme Court's stringent standards for
using race in affirmative action cases to less stringent standards applied by lower courts
for considering race in resolving family law disputes).
257 At least this is the case officially. As I have examined in some of my previous
work, unofficially, we continue to police interracial sexual intimacy in ways large and
small. See, e.g., Capers, The Trial of Bigger Thomas, supra note 17 (discussing cases that
influenced RICHARD WRIGHT, NATIVE SON (1940), which racialized and sexualized black
defendants and was the first African American-authored novel to be selected for the
Book-of-the-Month Club); Capers, The Unintentional Rapist, supra note 17 (examining
the "sexualization of race and racialization of rape").
258 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2013) (defining covered employer as "a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year, and any agent of such a person").
259 See id. § 3603(b)(1) (2013) (excluding from the Fair Housing Act bona fide
private individual owners selling or renting three or fewer units).
260 Jeff Karoub, Some Patients Won't See Nurses of a Different Race, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Feb. 22, 2013, 8:00 PM), http://www.apnewsarchive.com/2013/Some-patients-
won%27t see nurses of different race/id-062fe21c417b4da98986901ce7be8c3f.
261 Id.
262 The story received attention in several media outlets, including CNN, USA Today,
Huffington Post, and NPR. See Ben Brumfield, Lawsuit: Race-Based Request Sidelined
Michigan Nurse, CNN (Feb. 17, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/16/us/
michigan-hospital-discrimination; Robin Erb, Hospital Settles Nurse's Discrimination Suit,
USA TODAY (Feb. 22, 2013, 10:45 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
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hospital's response were far from unusual. As Kimani Paul-Emile has
observed based on her review of several studies, such discrimination
occurs "quite frequently, and healthcare providers actively and
routinely facilitate it."263 In ways small and large, we quietly permit
some racial preferences.
The question of whether we could imagine a regime that favored same-
race bodily searches - much in the way that we favor same-gender
searches for airport passengers, for arrestees and prisoners, and for
students - is also complicated by the fact that our history of racial
segregation has always been undergirded by a concern about cross-sex
commingling. The "separate but equal" doctrine that enabled de jure
racial segregation of public schools - the practice of which was famously
ruled violative of the Equal Protection Clause in Brown v. Board of
Education264 - was predicated not only on the notion that the races
should be kept separate, but also on the specific fear of sexual intimacy
between white women and black men. 265 Nor was the concern merely
social. Laws punished interracial cohabitation more severely than intra-
racial cohabitation, 266 and expressly prohibited interracial marriage. 267
2013/02/22/hospital-settles-discrimination-suit/1940575/; Sara Gates, Tonya Battle,
African American Nurse, Sues Michigan Hospital for Racial Discrimination, HUFFINGTON
POST (Feb. 16, 2013, 4:51 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/16/tonya-battle-
hurley-medical-center-race-discrimination n 2702373.html.
263 Kimani Paul-Emile, Patients' Racial Preferences and the Medical Culture of
Accommodation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 462, 465 (2012). The sitcom All in the Family even
made a laugh line out of this preference. Asked why it is so hard for black students to
become doctors, Archie Bunker responds, "Because nobody wants to see a black guy
coming at them with a knife." See Matt Zoller Seitz, Why "All in the Family" Still Matters,
SALON (Jan. 12, 2011, 3:01 PM), http://www.salon.com/2011/01/12/all in the family/.
264 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
265 For a discussion of this dynamic, see 1. Bennett Capers, The Crime of Loving:
Loving, Lawrence, and Beyond, in LOVING V. VIRGINIA IN A POST-RACIAL WORLD:
RETHINKING RACE, SEX, AND MARRIAGE 114, 121-24 (Kevin Noble Maillard & Rose
Cuison Villazor eds., 2012). See also Serena Mayeri, The Strange Career of Jane Crow:
Sex Segregation and the Transformation of Anti-Discrimination Discourse, 18 YALEJ.L. &
HUMAN. 187, 192-96 (2006).
266 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (invalidating the conviction,
on equal protection grounds, of interracial couple convicted under Florida's adultery
and lewd cohabitation laws where the law imposed harsher punishments on interracial
couples). A century earlier, the Court upheld a similar law from Alabama. See Pace v.
Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 585 (1882), overruled in part by McLaughlin, 379 U.S, at 188
("In our view ... Pace represents a limited view of the Equal Protection Clause which
has not withstood analysis in the subsequent decisions of this Court.").
267 At one time, as many as thirty states banned interracial marriage. See RACHEL F.
MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE AND ROMANCE 17 (2001). In
1967, when the Court invalidated anti-miscegenation statutes as violative of equal
protection and due process, sixteen states had such statutes. See Loving v. Virginia, 388
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Our history of sex-dependent racial segregation is not limited to the
well-known education and sexual intimacy cases. Two other histories
are equally revealing: our history of sex and race segregated rail cars,
and our history of sex and race segregated public pools.
For many, the mention of segregated rail cars will bring to mind the
racial segregation challenged in Plessy v. Ferguson,268 in which the Court
ruled that Louisiana's separate-coach law did not violate the Thirteenth
or Fourteenth Amendment, and ushered in the "separate but equal"
doctrine. In fact, the history of segregated rail travel in the United States
began not with racial segregation, the type Plessy challenged in 1896,
but with gender segregation. As early as the 1840s, rail cars, which were
divided into parlor cars for "ladies" and smoking cars for
"gentlemen. ' ' 269 The historian Barbara Young Welke describes the
difference this way:
Based on the assumption that a railroad car for ladies should
match the comfort and safety of a lady's parlor, a ladies' car might
be equipped with a comfortable sofa or at the least seats covered
with "plush." Ladies' cars often included an ice-water dispenser
and, more important, had two water closets, one at each end of
the car, so that women did not have to choose between waiting
or suffering the embarrassment and sexual suggestion of using
the same water closet as men riding in the car. 270
U.S. 1, 6, 11 (1967).
268 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,541-42 (1896), overruled by Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
269 BARBARA YOUNG WELKE, RECASTING AMERICAN LIBERTY: GENDER, RACE, LAW, AND THE
RAILROAD REVOLUTION, 1865-1920, at 254 (2001). Gender segregation was the result of
custom, and not legally required. Id. at 327. Nonetheless, it often received a judicial stamp
of approval. A Wisconsin Supreme Court opinion illustrates this approval:
The use of railroads for the common carriage of passengers has not only vastly
increased travel generally, but has also specially led women to travel without
male companions. To such, the protection which is a natural instinct of
manhood towards their sex, is specially due by common carriers. And, in view
of the crowds of men of all sorts and conditions and habits constantly traveling
by railroad, it appears to us to be not only a reasonable regulation, but almost
if not quite a humane duty, for railroad companies to appropriate a car of each
passenger train primarily for women and men accompanying them; from
which men unaccompanied by women should be excluded.., so as to group
women of good character on the train together, sheltered as far as practicable
from annoyance and insult. It is a severe comment on our civilization that
such a regulation should be necessary, but the necessity is patent to all
experience and intelligence.
Bass v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 36 Wis. 450, 460 (1874) (citation omitted).
270 WELKE, supra note 269, at 254.
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By contrast, the smoking car was the:
[Elquivalent to the tavern or the men's club. . . . The
appointments - wooden seats at most covered with leather,
broadcloth, or cane; bare floors; and spittoons - embodied the
assumption of male ruggedness. 2
7
'
In short, gender segregation took center stage; racial segregation, to
the extent it made an appearance at all - usually in the form of slaves
or servants traveling with their masters or mistresses - was an
afterthought. 272 The racial dynamics necessarily changed after the Civil
War, first with Southern states passing "Black Codes" in an attempt to
circumscribe the Thirteenth Amendment, and then with passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and
1875. Although there was little consistency 273 - railroads were
privately owned, mostly intrastate, and regulated only by common law
- in general, railroads began to limit black men and women to the
smoking car. Sometimes, rail carriers partitioned the smoking car so
that black men and women would be separate from white men, and
other times was not. The widespread passage of Jim Crow laws further
solidified segregation along race lines, with some railroads even adding
"emigrant cars" to keep newly arrived Irish, Italians and other
immigrants separate from "first class" travel. 274 By 1901, there was not
a state in the South that did not require that black and white passengers
be separated on railroads. 275
Although there is more, much more, to this history than can be
adequately covered here, two things stand out. One, that the naturalness
of gender segregation was often used to defend the naturalness of racial
segregation. And two, that what was crucial to racial segregation, from
its inception, was inseparable from gender segregation.
271 Id. at 255.
272 Welke notes that the status was sufficiently clear prior to the Civil War that
whites tolerated some flexibility in access. See id. at 255-56 ("In the South before the
Civil War, formal separation was less important; slavery cast its shadow over all blacks.
In rail travel, slaves accompanied their masters and mistresses."). These clear lines also
permitted flexibility when it came to some middle-class free blacks. See id. at 256 ("A
select few among free blacks North and South - because of lightness of skin, lack of
'negro features,' wealth, and culture - were allowed to enjoy some of the privileges of
first-class ladies' and gentlemen's accommodations.").
273 A conductor of one train might permit a black woman to ride in the ladies' parlor,
while a conductor on the next train on the same line might refuse. Id. at 261.
274 Id. at 265.
275 Id. at 348.
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West Chester and Philadelphia Railroad Co. v. Miles,276 a decision of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, is one of several cases that relied on the
gender segregation analogy. The question, the court wrote, "is, whether
a public carrier may, in the exercise of his private right of property, and
in the due performance of his public duty, separate passengers by any
other well-defined characteristic than that of sex." 277 The court
concluded that since segregation by gender was acceptable, segregation
by race was acceptable too.278 Hall v. DeCuir,279 a case before the
Supreme Court, involved a similar argument:
Passengers on steamboats are not huddled together, male and
female, in the same apartments[;I separation on the basis of sex is
a requirement of common decency.... No one pretends ... that
this uniform separation violates the law of equality; nor can it be
tortured into an assertion of the superiority of one sex or the
other .... A male passenger, basing his right on the laws of the
United States, might have complained that he was not allowed a
stateroom in the ladies' cabin, with as much force and propriety
as a colored passenger could have complained that he was
furnished apartments and accommodations not inferior to, but
different in locality, from those furnished to white passengers.280
Miles also points to the second observation: that gender segregation
and race segregation worked in tandem. In language that early anti-
miscegenation cases repeated, the court noted that God had separated
the races on the globe for a reason, and that "all social organizations
which lead to their amalgamation are repugnant to the law of nature." 281
The concern was not primarily with white men "amalgamating" with
black women; after all, in the period between the end of the Civil War
and the widespread adoption of Jim Crows laws, it was common to
assign black women and black men to the smoking car where white men
were present.282  Rather, the concern was with black men
"amalgamating" with white women. The concern was so acute that
276 West Chester & Phila. R.R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209 (1867).
277 Id. at 211.
278 Id.
279 Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 488 (1878) (holding that a Louisiana law that sought
to prohibit racial discrimination on its railroads was unconstitutional because it
infringed upon Congress's power to regulate commerce).
280 WELKE, supra note 269, at 328 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
281 Miles, 55 Pa. at 213.
282 WELKE, supra note 269, at 260-61. Indeed, black women were left unprotected
from white and black men by these arrangements. Id. at 284-85.
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white women often brought suits against railroads for allowing black
men in their proximity. The language of one plaintiff was rather typical:
"I was rendered nervous and apprehensive by the presence of a negro
man, as any Southern lady would be." 283
Our history of segregated public pools tells a similar story. As the
historian Jeff Wiltes details in his book Contested Waters: A Social
History of Swimming Pools in America, public swimming pools, which
were popular in the North in the beginning in the late 1800s, initially
functioned as public baths.284 Blacks, recent immigrants, and white
laborers swam and bathed together; men and women, however, used
the pools on separate days. 285 In other words, gender and class, not race,
separated municipal pools. 286 All of this changed around the 1920s,
when the social division shifted from gender to race. It was one thing to
permit blacks and whites to enjoy the same pool when they were
segregated by gender. It was another thing entirely when pools began
to allow men and women to swim together. The rise in gender-
integrated pools directly led to the decline of race-integrated pools, 28 7
with whites in some cases "quite literally beat[ing] blacks out of the
water at gender-integrated pools because they would not permit black
men to interact with white women at such intimate public spaces." 288
This de jure racial segregation persisted until the 1950s, when federal
courts began to invalidate laws and regulations that segregated pools
along racial lines.289 This is not to say that segregation ended, but rather
that de facto segregation replaced de jure segregation in many areas,
especially as many whites moved to the suburbs and installed private
backyard pools.290
I began this Part by asking why it is that we allow gender-based
preferences to dictate policy and factor into Fourth Amendment
283 Id. at 316.
284 JEFF WILTSE, CONTESTED WATERS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF SWIMMING POOLS IN
AMERICA 8-10 (2007).
285 Id. at 1, 48.
286 Wiltse observes that Northerners' use of municipal pools throughout the
Progressive Era reinforced class and gender divisions but not racial distinctions. Cities
strictly segregated pools along gender lines. By contrast, black and working-class whites
commonly swam together. Id. at 48.
287 Id. at 85. It is perhaps not a coincidence that Fairground Park Pool in St. Louis,
Missouri was both the first sex-integrated pool and the first pool to segregate blacks. Id.
at 82-85.
288 Id. at 4.
289 Cf. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 219 (1971) (discussing desegregation of
public school facilities).
290 WILTSE, supra note 284, at 183-85.
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reasonableness determinations, but disallow race-based preferences.
One answer is that we should not allow either. But what our history of
gender segregation and race segregation suggests is that the answer is
more complex, especially since the two segregations have often worked
in tandem. This history suggests something else too. It suggests that
maybe the initial question - why do we allow gender-based preferences
and disallow race-based preferences to inform the Fourth Amendment
- is flawed in its premises.
Consider again the most common Fourth Amendment areas where
gender matters: stop and frisks, searches incident to arrest, school
searches, jails and prisons, and airport security. While government
policy and judicial decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment favor
same-gender searches in all of these areas, in some areas this same-
gender preference can be categorized as strong; in other areas it can be
categorized as weak. In fact, we are most insistent about prohibiting
cross-gender searches when it comes to airport searches conducted by
the TSA,291 and we are least insistent in the prison context.292 It is quite
possible that this is because we say prisoners, as breakers of the law, are
entitled to less protection than non-prisoners. We certainly say that they
are entitled to fewer, if any, privacy rights. 293 Or as Amy Kapczynski
posits, it may be that prisoners' bodies "are seen as less sacrosanct." 294
It may also explain why, on the continuum of cross-gender searches,
stop and frisks fall somewhere in the middle. Although those subject to
stop and frisks have not necessarily done anything wrong, in theory at
least they have done something to justify an officer's reasonable
suspicion that they have engaged in criminal activity and may be armed.
Hence, courts and policy makers, though favoring same-gender
searches, permit cross-gender Terry frisks. Lastly, this notion of a scale
of criminality, with convicted felons at one end and stop-and-frisk
suspects in the middle, may also explain the exacting preference we give
to same-gender searches in the airport security context, where the TSA
explicitly prohibits cross-gender screening.295 We imagine the airline
291 See supra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
292 See infra notes 301-02 and accompanying text.
293 See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26 (1984) (holding that prisoners
lose all reasonable expectations of privacy by virtue of incarceration); Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979) ("[Gliven the realities of institutional confinement, any
reasonable expectation of privacy that a detainee retained necessarily would be of a
diminished scope.").
294 Kapczynski, supra note 119, at 1273.
295 See Pat-Downs: What to Know Before You Go, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN.,
http://www.tsa.gov/traveler-information/pat-downs (last updated July 16, 2014).
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passenger as the prototypical good citizen, entitled to full protection.
For the airline passenger randomly singled out for a pat down, we insist
on a screener of the same sex; of the individual stopped and frisked by
a police officer, we assume she might be engaged in criminal activity, so
she receives a little less protection; of the convicted felon, who has been
judicially marked as bad, we give the least protection.
This is one way to understand the range of our judicial and policy
preference for same-gender searches, from strong to weak. But it is not
the only way. 296 I want to offer another, more troubling explanation,
one that calls into question the assumption that we tolerate preferences
that are gender-based, but not those that are race-based. Consider, once
again, the area of Fourth Amendment protection where we have the
strongest preference for same-gender searches (airport security) and the
area where we extend the least protection (prisons). Now consider how
those areas map onto our preconceptions and implicit biases about
race. 297 In the public imagination, we prefigure the typical prisoner,
regardless of sex, as black or Hispanic; and prefigure prison guards as
white.298 The situation is reversed when it comes to airline travel. We
imagine the typical airline passenger, regardless of sex, as white, and
imagine the typical TSA employee as a person of color.299 Is it possible
296 For example, it may be that we have the strongest aversion to cross-gender
searches in the TSA context and the weakest aversion in the prison context for a
practical reason: that given the gender demographics of staff in the respective areas,
same-gender searches are relatively easy to accommodate in the TSA context and less
so in the prison context.
297 On the prevalence of implicit biases about race, see Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit
Ingroup Favoritism, Outgrou p Favoritism, and Their Behavioral Manifestations, 17 Soc.
JUST. RES. 143, 146 (2004);Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489,
1506-14 (2005); L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95
MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2035-56 (2011).
298 More than 60% of inmates incarcerated in state and federal prisons are racial and
ethnic minorities. Racial Disparity, SENTENCING PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.
org/template/page.cfm?id=122. (last visited Oct. 12, 2014, 4:01 PM). By contrast,
correction officers tend to be whites. See Melvina Sumter, The Correctional Work Force
Faces Challenges in the 21st Century, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Aug. 2008, at 100, available
at https://www.aca.org/researchlpdf/ResearchNotesAugO8.pdf (based on data from the
American Correctional Association, the "typical correctional employee is a white, non-
Hispanic, moderately educated male who is in his mid-30s"). There is even the familiar
joke: What do you call one white guy with five black guys? "Coach." What do you call
one white guy with 100 black guys? "Warden."
299 According to one study, domestic airline passengers are overwhelmingly white.
Among the various carriers examined, Delta Airlines had the largest percentage of black
passengers at 9%. See Jamie Peltier, Delta Research: Demographics (Dec. 10, 2011),
http://www.tc.umn.eduJ-pelti044/Delta%20Demographics.pdf. In terms of TSA
employees, over 40% are minorities, with blacks and Hispanics making up more than a
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that race partially explains why we have the strongest preference for
same-gender searches in the context of airline travel, and the weakest
preference in the context of jails and prisons? In other words, is it
possible we are comfortable with whites searching people of color, but
less comfortable with people of color searching whites? Allow me to
further complicate the question by reinserting gender and sex. Is it
possible that part of our strong preference for same-gender pat downs
in the TSA context is the concern that, to allow otherwise would result
in black and brown male TSA screeners touching white women?300 Is it
possible that part of our general indifference in the prison context is
traceable to our lack of discomfort when the situation is reversed, and
we imagine white correction officers touching black and Hispanic
women,30 1 whom we already view as hypersexual, and indeed
"unrapeable"?302
third of the workforce, a percentage far in excess of their representation in the civilian
workforce. See U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., DATA, ANALYSIS AND DOCUMENTATION: FEDERAL
EMPLOYMENT REPORTS, TABLE 1 - RACE/NAT'L ORIGIN DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL CIVILIAN
EMPLOYMENT: EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES, WORLDWIDE, SEPTEMBER 30, 2006 (2006),
available at https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/data-analysis-documentation/
federal-employment-reports/demographics/2006/tablelmw.pdf.
300 On the continued discomfort many Americans have with this particular dyad, see
ANGELA ONWUACHI-WILLIG, ACCORDING TO OUR HEARTS: RHINELANDER V. RHINELANDER
AND THE LAW OF THE MULTIRACIAL FAMILY 121-55 (2013).
301 Indeed, there is a long history of white access, both visually and physically, to
black female bodies; from the access white men had to black women during American
slavery, to the circus-like traveling display throughout Europe of Sarah Bartmann (an
African woman with a large posterior who was called the "Hottentot Venus"), to the
inspection of racially ambiguous women during race trials, to pop star Miley Cyrus's
slapping the particularly rotund buttocks of a black woman during her performance at
the MTV Video Music Awards. On the access to black women during slavery, see
Adrienne Davis, "Don't Let Nobody Bother Yo' Principle": The Sexual Economy of American
Slavery, in SISTER CIRCLE: BLACK WOMEN AND WORK 103, 105-21 (Sharon Harley & The
Black Women and Work Collective eds., 2002). On the inspection of racially ambiguous
women in court, see ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 300, at 13-14. On the "Hottentot
Venus," see Sander L. Gilman, Black Bodies, White Bodies: Toward an Iconography of
Female Sexuality in Late Nineteenth-Century Art, Medicine, and Literature, in "RACE,"
WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE 223, 225-48 (Henry Louis Gates ed., 1986). On Miley Cyrus's
performance, see Jacob Bernstein, The Pro-Miley Backlash, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2013, at
El; and Tressie McMillan Cottom, Brown Body, White Wonderland, SLATE (Aug. 29,
2013, 8:04 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/double x/doublex/2013/08/miley_
cyrus-vma-performance-white appropriation of black bodies.html.
302 For more on how women of color are often assumed to be hypersexual, see
Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, supra note 14, at 866; Crenshaw, supra note 45, at 1266-
69; and Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 581, 598-99 (1990). See generally MELISSA V. HARRIS-PERRY, SISTER CITIZEN: SHAME,
STEREOTYPES, AND BLACK WOMEN IN AMERICA (2011) (discussing persistent stereotypes
that black women encounter in present-day America).
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While these questions may be difficult to answer, what I am certain
of is this: they are worth asking, especially for those of us committed
not just to gender equality, but to racial equality as well.
V. UNSEXING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
[U]nsex me.
- Lady Macbeth 303
Some years ago, in Johnson v. Phelan,30 4 two jurists took opposing
sides on the issue of whether a male inmate's rights were violated where
female guards were assigned to monitor male prisoners' movements and
could "see men naked in their cells, the shower, and the toilet." 305 For
his part, Judge Richard Posner viewed cross-gender surveillance as a
threat to tradition, and even to "civilized" society:
There are radical feminists who regard "sex" as a social
construction and the very concept of "the opposite sex,"
implying as it does the dichotomization of the "sexes" (the
"genders," as we are being taught to say), as a sign of patriarchy.
For these feminists the surveillance of naked male prisoners by
female guards and naked female prisoners by male guards are
way stations on the road to sexual equality. If prisoners have no
rights, the reconceptualization of the prison as a site of
progressive social engineering should give us no qualms.
Animals have no rights to wear clothing. Why prisoners, if they
are no better than animals? There is no answer, if the premise
is accepted. But it should be rejected, and if it is rejected, and
the duty of a society that would like to think of itself as civilized
to treat its prisoners humanely therefore acknowledged, then I
think that the interest of a prisoner in being free from
unnecessary cross-sex surveillance has priority over the unisex
bathroom movement and requires us to reverse the judgment of
the district court throwing out this lawsuit.306
303 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 1, sc. 5 (Burton Raffel ed., Yale University
Press ed. 2005).
304 Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144 (7th Cir. 1995).
305 Id. at 145. Though the court decided the case on Eighth Amendment grounds,
their arguments are informative. For an insightful discussion of the exchange and Judge
Posner's opinion in particular, see Mary Anne Case, All the World's the Men's Room, 74
U. CHI. L. REV. 1655, 1657 (2007).
306 Johnson, 69 F.3d at 151-52 (Posner, J., concurring and dissenting).
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Judge Easterbrook, writing for the majority, disagreed:
Physicians and nurses of one sex routinely examine the other.
In exotic places such as California people regularly sit in saunas
and hot tubs with unclothed strangers .... [T]he Constitution
does not require prison managers to respect the social
conventions of free society. . . . More to the point, the clash
between modesty and equal employment opportunities has
been played out in sports. Women reporters routinely enter
locker rooms after games. How could an imposition that male
athletes tolerate be deemed cruel and unusual punishment?30 7
It should come as no surprise that I think Judge Easterbrook is closer
to the truth. There is something old-fashioned and prudish in Judge
Posner's suggestion that the sexes should be kept separate, and that for
a woman to see a man in the nude is inhumane, or at least in his
suggestion that it is social engineering for the law to trump these
concerns to further some goal of equality. Indeed, his argument recalls
earlier arguments used to justify racial segregation and distinctions.308
Not only is tradition alone insufficient to justify disparate treatment.
Given its history, tradition is ground for viewing disparate treatment
with special scrutiny.
One of the goals of this Article has been to unmoor the Fourth
Amendment from tradition by putting forth an argument against. I have
argued that while there may be "benefits" associated with government
policies and Fourth Amendment reasonableness determinations that
favor same-gender searches - for example, compliance with societal
norms - there are great costs, including the entrenchment of those
norms. Such policies and judicial decisions entrench stereotypes about
men as sexual aggressors and women as vulnerable victims; they erase,
indeed closet, sexual difference; and they are racially inflected. Perhaps
most importantly, they undermine our anti-discrimination principles,
functioning as a barrier to our goal of gender indifference. If the true
objective is gender parity, gender equality, and gender indifference,
then having official policies and judicial decisions predicated on
307 Id. at 148 (majority opinion).
308 See WOODWARD, supra note 213, at 69-74.
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traditional notions about gender modesty and privacy thwarts that
goal. 309 It is that simple.3 10
That is part of my argument against blind adherence to gender-based
assumptions in how we conduct searches. Another part is based on the
Fourth Amendment. Quite simply, when we incorporate traditional
notions of gender into our Fourth Amendment analysis, we diminish
the Fourth Amendment. If the Fourth Amendment has an equality
component - as I have argued,311 as Yale Kamisar has argued, 312 as
Akhil Amar has argued 313 - then it degrades the Fourth Amendment
309 Of course, some may still counter that gender and bodily searches are relatively
inconsequential. But they are wrong. To borrow from Louise Antony:
[i] t is the ubiquity and banality of the linguistic and social practices ... that
accounts for their effectiveness in communicating the message that gender
hierarchy is both natural and inevitable. Moreover, the insignificance of each
particular custom considered on its own misleads as to the total effect of there
being a system of gendered practices.
Antony, supra note 235, 3-4 (1998).
310 When I have presented this argument at workshops, a few commentators have
initially found it hard to imagine such a cultural shift from a norm of same-gender
searches to a norm of gender-indifferent searches. However, one has only to think of
how the norm of mid-wives (to preserve the modesty of women giving birth) shifted
into a norm of male obstetricians (largely due the medicalization of childbirth and the
exclusion of women from medical schools) to a norm now that is more gender neutral.
At each point, there were likely many who found it hard to imagine a cultural shift, and
yet a cultural shift indeed happened.
311 Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, supra note 22, at 36-37.
312 Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal
Procedure: From Powell to Gideon, from Escobedo to ... in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR
TIME 1, 68-69 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1965).
313 Akhil R. Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 808-09
(1994). Other scholars have similarly argued that equal protection concerns should
inform Fourth Amendment analysis. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and
the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163, 193-94 (arguing courts should not bifurcate
Equal Protection analysis from Fourth Amendment analysis); Josh Bowers, Probable
Cause, Constitutional Reasonableness, and the Unrecognized Point of a "Pointless
Indignity," 66 STAN. L. REV. 987, 1037 (2014) ("[Plurposeful discrimination against
protected classes is almost always constitutionally prohibited, but plenty of room
for mischief (unconscious or otherwise) remains between the limits of the Fourth
Amendment and equal protection .... "); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts about First
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 844 (1994) (arguing "the creation of professional
police forces and the deeply rooted problem of racially discriminatory treatment of
black citizens by the police constitute the kind of circumstances that call for new
constructions of the Fourth Amendment"); Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual
Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 961 (1999) ("[lit is too
soon to take the Fourth Amendment off the table as a source of relief for racially
motivated searches and seizures.").
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to have it serve as the gatekeeper of old-fashioned ideas about gender
difference in propriety. 314 That is wrong.
But while I have been vocal about framing an argument against
traditional notions of gender, I also want to begin a conversation, not
end one. The issues I raise deserve colloquy, not soliloquy. What is
needed is a conversation in which we consider, honestly and without
circumlocution, both the benefits of same-sex searches and, as I have
argued above, their substantial costs. If the concern is that a
government-endorsed preference for same-gender searches is at odds
with our goal of gender equality and neutrality, then we should consider
what alternatives exist that can address this concern. Might there be
technologies, if not today,315 then tomorrow,316 that can accomplish the
state's interest in engaging in bodily searches to maintain safety without
raising the troubling issue of gender?317 Just consider. The New York
314 This is not to suggest that the Fourth Amendment's emphasis on reasonableness
is itself necessarily unreasonable. Rather, the argument I am making here is similar to
the argument made by scholars such as Cynthia Lee in discussing the "reasonable
person" in the context of criminal law defenses such as self-defense. The argument is
that our conception of reasonableness, rather than being purely positive or descriptive,
should have a normative component. See CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE
MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM 235-39 (2003).
315 On the use of current technology in general, see David A. Harris, Superman's X-
Ray Vision and the Fourth Amendment: The New Gun Detection Technology, 69 TEMP. L.
REV. 1, 7-14 (1996). One such technology that may warrant further consideration and
use is canine sniffs, which generally fall outside of the purview of the Fourth
Amendment. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417-18 (2013); United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 697-98 (1983); Irus Braverman, Passing the Sniff Test: Police Dogs
as Surveillance Technology, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 81, 89-90 (2013). The use of dogs, which
can be trained to detect narcotics or explosives, would avoid many of the concerns
raised in this Article about sexy searches.
316 For example, for airport travel, might there be a next generation of millimeter-
wave radar devices that can detect both metal and non-metal objects and preserve
passengers' modesty? Other technologies that are currently under development through
the National Institute of Justice include a hand-held battery-operated Weapons and
Non-permitted Devices Detector ("WANDD"), which would obviate the need for any
human contact. See Detecting Items Hidden on a Person or Inside a Body, NAT'L INST. OF
JUSTICE (Aug. 29, 2012), http://www.nij.gov/topics/technology/detection-surveillance/
contraband-detection/person.htm. For more on new search technologies in general, see
NICHOLAS G. PAULTER, NAT'L INST. OFJUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, NCJ-184432, GUIDE
TO THE TECHNOLOGIES OF CONCEALED WEAPON AND CONTRABAND IMAGING AND DETECTION
33-50 (2001), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/184432.pdf. As I have
argued in a related context, our goal should be to use the Fourth Amendment to harness
technology's full potential in a way that benefits communities and ensures privacy. See
1. Bennett Capers, Crime, Surveillance, and Communities, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 959, 984-
85 (2013).
317 One might even imagine extending the world envisioned by Donna Haraway in
her seminal feminist text SIMIANS, CYBORGS, AND WOMEN: THE REINVENTION OF NATURE,
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City Police Department is currently working with the Defense
Department to develop gun-scan technology capable of detecting
concealed firearms from a distance. 318 Researchers at the University of
Michigan are developing radar technology that schools can use to insure
that students do not have weapons. 319 And private companies are
developing software that uses cameras to read minute shifts in facial
expressions, sensing whether a person may be lying about, for example,
possessing a sharp object or some other weapon. 320 Each of these
technologies has the potential to vastly reduce the number of bodily
searches.
And where humans are necessary - the "laying of hands" that was
the bte noir during oral argument in Terry321 - what steps can we take
to insure that the searches humans conduct - whatever their gender-
are non-sexy searches? If some searches cross the line into
inappropriate sexual searches, might it be more effective to focus on
identifying and removing the individuals conducting those searches -
"Pornstache" in Orange is the New Black; Matt Dillon in Crash; the
trooper Kelly Helleson in Texas; those TSA employees whose hands
linger a little too long; those correction officers who uses bodily
searches as "ceremonies of degradation" 322 - rather than castigating
a world in which post-gender, sexless cyborgs conduct bodily searches, and thus
eliminate the risk of sexy searches entirely. See generally DONNAJ. HARAWAY, SIMIANS,
CYBORGS, AND WOMEN: THE REINVENTION OF NATURE (1991).
318 See Al Baker, Police Device Aims to Take Guesswork Out of Detecting Guns, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2012, at A19; Rocco Parascandola, Larry McShane & Corky Siemaszko,
NO HANDS! NYPD Gizmo Detects Guns Frisk-Free, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 24, 2013, at
NEWS 2. Indeed, such technology has the benefit of not only reducing sexy searches. It
is also likely to reduce racial profiling resulting from implicit biases. It will also reduce
the "targeting harm" that Sherry Colb has written so eloquently about, see Sherry F.
Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM.
L. REV. 1456, 1464 (1996), as well as Bill Stuntz's stigmatic harm, see WilliamJ. Stuntz,
The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265, 1273 (1999).
In addition, since Terry stops permit a frisk for weapons but not for other contraband
such as drugs, such technology can also curb unlawful frisks for drugs.
319 Kelsey D. Atherton, Researcher Says Radar Tech Could Detect Guns at School,
POPULAR SCI. (Mar. 25, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/
2013-03/how-can-radar-help-school-safety.
320 PAUL K. DAVIS ET AL., RAND NAT'L DEF. RESEARCH INST., USING BEHAVIORAL
INDICATORS TO HELP DETECT POTENTIAL VIOLENT ACTS: A REVIEW OF THE SCIENCE BASE, at
xxvi-xxvii (2013), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research-
reports/RR200/RR215/RANDRR215.sum.pdf; Anne Eisenberg, When Algorithms Grow
Accustomed to Your Face, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2013, at BU3.
321 Transcript of Oral Argument, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (No. 67), available
at http://www.soc.umn.edu/-samaha/cases/terry-v_ohio_oralarguments.htm.
322 1 borrow this phrase from Kaaryn Gustafson's work. See Kaaryn Gustafson,
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and stereotyping the entire gender to which they belong?323 All of these
questions are deserving of research, data, and yes, conversation. Maybe,
just maybe, this conversation can be a starting point for both reducing
the real risk that a search will be inappropriate, and reducing the
number of bodily searches in toto.324 Maybe, just maybe, we will
conclude that in some circumstances, like that of middle school student
accused of having ibuprofen, or marijuana, or indeed any drug, bodily
searches are never appropriate. 325
CONCLUSION
The first and more modest ambition of this Article has been to show
that sexy searches, those searches that courts and other decision-makers
assume run the risk of sexual impropriety, inform much of Fourth
Amendment practice and jurisprudence, from Terry stop and frisks, to
how we monitor prisoners, to which TSA employees search which
passengers. The second and far grander ambition has been to make an
Degradation Ceremonies and the Criminalization of Low-Income Women, 3 UC IRVINE L.
REV. 297, 300-02 (2013).
323 It is likely focusing on individuals rather that groups will have other benefits as
well. For example, studies of police brutality have shown that offenders do not have a
normal distribution, but rather what statisticians refer to as a "power law" distribution:
a few repeat offenders are in fact responsible for the bulk of offending conduct. Where
that is the case, removing those officers can have trickle down effects, subtly changing
the culture of officers more generally. For more on the "power law" distribution among
police, see Malcolm Gladwell, Million-Dollar Murray: Why Problems Like Homelessness
May Be Easier to Solve than to Manage, NEW YORKER, Feb. 13, 2006, at 98. On the
importance of attending to police culture in order to address police misconduct, see
Kami Chavis Simmons, New Governance and the "New Paradigm" of Police Accountability:
A Democratic Approach to Police Reform, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 380-89 (2010); and
Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration in the
Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489,
496-506 (2008).
324 It is telling that Justice Scalia views such searches, even when conducted by
someone of the same sex, as an indignity that warrants a higher degree of justification
than what the Court currently permits. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 379-
83 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656, 680-87 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
325 As Justice Stevens has put it, "It does not require a constitutional scholar to
conclude that a nude search of a 13-year-old child is an invasion of constitutional rights
of some magnitude." Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 380
(2009) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Redding herself, after hearing oral arguments in her case, had a suggestion
worth repeating: Maybe we could try calling the student's parents first. See Dahlia
Lithwick, Search Me: The Supreme Court is Neither Hot Nor Bothered by Strip Searches,
SLATE (Apr. 21, 2009, 7:49 PM), http://www.slate.comarticles/news-and politics/
supreme-court_dispatches/2009/04/searchme. 1.html.
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argument against: to show how such preferences stereotype men and
women, erase sexual difference, entrench and over-determine gender
difference, and function as a type of state-imposed sexual discipline
with troubling racial undertones. For too long, we have accepted
without question gender-preferences in Fourth Amendment practice
and jurisprudence. It is time, past time, to question them. The goal is
not necessarily a world that is genderless, but certainly a world where
gender matters less. I hope, too, that I have begun a broader
conversation: that any discussion of sexy searches should question not
just our preference for same-gender searches but also how we can
instead design non-sexy searches. The discussion should also include
how we can we reduce bodily searches more generally.

